The War

RITTER LIBRARY
BALDWIN-WALLACE
COLLEGE

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts—February 10, 1973, 50 cents

NR RTT3
RITTER LIBR PERIODICALS
BALDWIN WALLACE COLL
BEREA OHIO
L079 1 0973
44017

One Supreme Court

Arthur J. Goldberg

Reconciliation?

Stanley Karnow from Saigon

Games With Topsy

John Osborne

In retrospect: Leslie H. Gelb, Anthony Lake, David G. Marr, Michael Novak, Bill Mauldin, Michael Walzer, Gaddis Smith, John Mueller, The Editors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vietnam
a time to build....



Photo Reproduction Rights given free by Maryknoll Fathers

A time to help . . . .

For the past ten years, the war was never far from your T.V. screen or newspaper. So much so that by now you may have lost the ability to be shocked; simple human compassion may have been an early casualty.

Regardless of this or of where your sympathies lay, there was little practical help you could give.

But now with one struggle ending, another begins. For the 39 million civilians the future looks grim.

Houses, schools, hospitals, villages, farms, factories, roads, railroads all over the country have been destroyed. Families have been shattered. So has the confidence of many Vietnamese in their ability to bring their country back to normal.

Since 1964, Oxfams in other Western countries have been helping to shelter and feed homeless and wounded civilians.

But now that we have the chance, Oxfam-America has launched a long-range rehabilitation program. $1500 has already been sent to defray training costs of 40 Vietnamese social workers at the Vanhanh Social Action Bureau. Oxfam's Field Director is on the spot in the south with this and other grass-roots projects; we will also help in the north.

Help is needed now, when the opportunity exists for the people to get up on their feet again.

Please send a check.

Mail your check to:
Oxfam-America, Inc., 1028 Connecticut Ave, NW, #922
Washington DC 20036

Enclosed is my donation of $_____.

Make check payable to Oxfam-America

NAME_____

ADDRESS _____

CITY_____ STATE_____ ZIP _____

ALL DONATIONS ARE TAX DEDUCTIBLE

OXFAM-AMERICA'S SPONSORS

Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith,
Allard Lowenstein, Paul McCloskey,
John Sly, Alvin Toffler, Cyrus Vance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Designed by Paul Oliver, Printing & Design, Wash. DC

You can help save Rina Begum for $15 a month. Or you can turn the page.



This is Rina Begum.
You've seen her face a thousand times before.
One of the tortured, tear-stained faces of the children of Bangladesh.
Eyes that have witnessed too much.
Bodies that have been nourished too little.
Minds that have developed almost not at all.
Living in a house of mud and grass in the village of Syedbari.
Existing off the land—a fraction of an acre—her father farms for food and a $9 a week income.
But Rina is more than a face. More than a statistic.
She is a human being entitled to the same rights as every child born into this world.
And you can help a Bangladesh child like Rina to have these rights for just $15 a month as a sponsor through Save the Children Federation.
$15 that will help Rina to have decent food and clothing and shelter and so much more.
Like the money needed to continue her education.
Like the chance for her father to increase his income.
Like the opportunity for her community to build schools, dig wells, and excavate ponds for fishing and washing.
For the Rina Begums of Bangladesh are what Save the Children is all about. Helping people—indeed, helping an entire community—to help itself.
For you there are many rewards. The chance to correspond with a child. To receive a photograph. And progress reports. And above all, to know you are reaching out to another human being. That's how Save the Children works. But without you it can't work. So please: clip this coupon and mail it today. Now you can turn the page.

Save the Children Federation, founded in 1932, is registered with the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. Contributions are income tax deductible.

I wish to contribute $15 a month to sponsor a ☐ boy ☐ girl.

☐ Where the need is most urgent ☐ Europe
☐ American Indian ☐ Latin America ☐ Middle East
☐ Appalachia ☐ Vietnam ☐ Korea
☐ Africa ☐ Bangladesh ☐ Southern U.S.

Enclosed is my first payment

☐ $15 monthly
☐ $45 quarterly
☐ $90 semi-annually
☐ $180 annually

☐ Instead, enclosed is my contribution of $_____
☐ Please send me more information.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION
345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017

NR 2/10/3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB

from Washington
February 3, 1973

Life or Death

►An American woman had a baby in Helsinki the other day. A fine, bouncing child; total cost, $7.50.

►An American tourist had a crisis in London last summer: appendectomy. All well—no charge.

►An embassy official had a letter from his mother in Ottawa last week; she is hospitalized with a tumor requiring cobalt treatment. Her only cost is for the telephone she had installed near her bed. (Bloody lucky she's not *here.)*

The United States is the only industrialized nation that doesn't have some form of national health insurance. Of course it means that taxes in other nations are generally higher; most of them don't think of these health costs as taxes, however (though they are). They think of them as purchase prices for something essential they have to buy.

The Amercian system is different. NBC put on a fine documentary the other night, "What Price Health?" There was this lower-middle-income worker with a heart attack. The hospital took him in, thinking he was covered by California's state health insurance; he wasn't. He cashed his life insurance for $4000 and gave it to the hospital, but he was left with $8000 still to pay. The doctor told him to go home, take it easy, relax, don't worry about anything. Rather hard to stop worrying, isn't it, when your life savings are gone, and you have a bad heart and no coverage.

The health thing is coming up again in Congress and in the President's budget. Mr. Nixon proposes to slash an estimated $1.6 billion from 23 million elderly Americans in Medicare. Mr. Nixon says no new taxes and is pounding Lyndon Johnson's Great Society with the wrecker's ball. There is not a peep in his budget about the four-billion-dollar Family Assistance Plan (guaranteed income) that he offered to the nation as "a new birth of independence" in August 1969. But that was three years ago.

Nevertheless, the idea of national health insurance won't down. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield told UPI reporter Roy McGhee the other day that this Congress will pass it: "It is absolutely necessary, with medical and hospital costs skyrocketing." Representative Wilbur Mills promises to take it up this year after tax reform and hopes for Senate enactment next year.

Young Richard Nixon saw his oldest brother Harold contract tuberculosis and saw him taken to a private sanitarium in Arizona. There he was bedridden for five years. All the time the bills mounted; in the same time the younger brother, Arthur, died, of tubercular meningitis; and then Harold died. The family was left in "catastrophic" straits —Nixon's own words.

The Nixon family rejected charity and outside help; they heroically fought their way out, leaving an indelible impression on Nixon that that's the way it ought to be—uphold the Puritan work ethic, reject hateful bureaucratic aid. There is nobility in this austere creed, without a doubt; but it is Calvinistic to apply the sink-or-swim standard to those who must have help or sink.

Chief backer for the new national health security program is Senator Edward Kennedy. He wasn't self-made; with a wealthy father he went through no such traumatic boyhood as Richard Nixon (though he knows what it is to have a retarded sister, Rosemary). Maybe some of Nixon's discipline would have been good for him, who knows? But the point here is that Kennedy, with Representative Martha Griffiths (D, Mich.), UAW head Leonard Woodcock and representatives of 40 national labor, church and consumer organizations (including AFL-CIO and Teamsters) are trying to pass a law for a health system at last. They kicked it off here last week; there are citizen lobbies for it now in a score of states, pressuring Congress.

If the law passes they might call it a memorial to Harry Truman; the greatest disappointment of his presidency, he told Edward R. Murrow in a 1957 TV interview, was failure to get a national system of health care. The AMA beat him.

A woman we know went to the hospital recently for an emergency check-up and chose a low-price room; she was discharged two days later—hospital bill, $237.10. The American Hospital Association says a day in a hospital now averages $105.30. Health costs have shot up 40 percent in four years.

It's all right to argue that people should buy health insurance; a lot don't, or can't. The US now spends around $90 billion annually for health care and buys $17 billion of insurance. But the US still ranks 12th to 15th among the world's nations in infant mortality (over 20 per 1000 live births) and it's here that the disparity in income between rich and poor really shows up. In Detroit, for example, in a better suburb, infant mortality is around 12 per 1000; in the poorest Detroit slum, by contrast, it is an incredible 69 per 1000.

While the US is graduating 10,000 doctors a year, the Soviet Union is graduating 35,000, according to Hubert Humphrey. The American doctors are the best in the world, using the finest technique; the problem is to get the doctors and technique out to the people. Here's a town, Nauvoo, Illinois. It had a big sign hanging over the main street for years, "Nauvoo Needs a Doctor." Five thousand US communities have no doctor.

In his budget message Mr. Nixon said the country has all the hospital beds it needs, so he's suspending the Hill-Burton Act subsidizing hospital construction. Maybe he is right, if the number of beds is averaged, but the present wait in an emergency hospital ward is still several hours.

Everybody agrees something must be done. The Kennedy-Griffiths plan is for a complete national health system costing $60 billion or $70 billion (but absorbing much private health costs). The American Medical Association wants merely a voluntary insurance scheme to protect against catastrophic costs. Mr. Nixon has a bill somewhere in between.

It's a pity Americans don't ever look up to Canada. There are 3000 miles of contiguous border fenced by an iron wall of apathy. Canadians have a reasonably satisfactory health system started in 1958. Virtually everybody is covered. The cost hasn't risen (except to the government). Doctors fought it at first but are generally reconciled.

Maybe "bureaucracy" is bad, but surely it is better than a system where life or death depends on ability to pay medical bills.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Vol. 168, No. 6, Issue 3031, February 10, 1973. Published 48 times a year and distributed by* The New Republic, *1244 19 h St., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Phone FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 50¢; Yearly subscriptions $15; Foreign $18; Armed Forces personnel or students, $10. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions, undelivered copies, and changes of address to Subscription Department,* The New Republic, *381 West Center Street, Marion, Ohio 43302. Copyright 1973 by Harrison-Blaine of New Jersey, Inc. Item g. Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Reader's Guide.*

Contents

5-10 Comment
Understanding the Budget, That Elitist Conspiracy, Abortion, Slamming the Door, Thalidomide Children
11 The Nixon Watch: Games with Topsy—*John Osborne*
13 Reconciliation—*Stanley Karnow*
14 One Supreme Court—*Arthur J. Goldberg*
17 Vietnam: Some Afterthoughts
18 Evolution of a Dove—*Bill Mauldin*
21 Calculating the Costs—*Eliot Marshall* and *Tom Geoghegan*
22 Comparisons with Korea—*John Mueller*
24 The Peace Movement—*Michael Walzer*
27 The Role of Congress—*Leslie H. Gelb* and *Anthony Lake*
29 How the American War Began—*Gaddis Smith*
31 From the Perspective of Morality: Rights and Wrongs—*Michael Novak*
33 Uncertainties of Reconstruction—*David G. Marr*
35 Films—*Stanley Kauffmann*
36 TV—*Sedulus*
36 Books—Reviews by *Reed Whittemore* and *Peter Barnes*

The Staff

Editor-in-Chief—Gilbert A. Harrison
Managing Editor—David Sanford
Literary Editor—Reed Whittemore
Associate Editors—John Osborne, Walter Pincus
Staff Writers—Thomas Geoghegan, Eliot Marshall
Assistant to the Editors—Gwen Somers
Assistant to the Literary Editor—Dianne Ferriss
Contributing Editors:
Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein, Donald Canty, Robert Coles, Joseph Featherstone, Doris Grumbach, Gerald W. Johnson, Peter J. Ognibene, John Seelye, Melville J. Ulmer, Allen S. Whiting, Paul R. Wieck
Films and Theater—Stanley Kauffmann
West Coast Editor—Peter Barnes
Production Manager—Mary Henninger
Assistant Production Manager—Ellen Cochran Hicks
Publisher—Robert J. Myers
Circulation Manager—Mary Kurtz
Business Manager—Pearl Wilmer Ramsey
Assistant Business Manager—Constance Cole Twining
New Republic Feature Syndicate—Elizabeth A. Scanlan
Advertising and Promotion—Ilene Briggin Kahane
Receptionist—Ruby McGowan

Understanding The Budget

The President's budget message, sent to Congress last week, is written in the tradition of those giants of a more innocent age, Calvin Coolidge and Warren G. Harding. Stubbornly, his message stands foursquare against the growth of a central government that has been squandering the nation's wealth and jeopardizing basic liberties. It promises an early end of inflation, yet no rise in taxes. It cuts social programs that weaken individual responsibility, but nurtures those that build the nation's strength through business and the military. In Mr. Nixon's words, it "gets government off our backs and out of our pockets." But what is to come out of our lives?

Understanding the decisions reached in the budget, the neat distinctions made between wasteful projects, requires knowing something about the cost-benefit principle. A project isn't warranted, according to this standard, unless measurable dollar returns at least offset expenses. So in the budget for fiscal 1974, which starts this July, we find such casualties as housing subsidies for lower-income families, rural electrification, public service employment, special programs in mental health, urban renewal, model cities, manpower training, some aids for education, support for libraries, student loans, improvements and extensions in the national parks, research and development on mass transportation, and training programs in medical and biological research. Some others, such as water pollution control, are cut back below levels originally authorized by Congress. No mention is made of the President's previously proposed welfare reform bill, which would have extended public assistance. That's in deep freeze for at least a year and perhaps longer.

True, appropriations for such broad categories as social welfare and natural resources will go on increasing next year and later because of prior legislative mandates, as in Social Security benefits, Medicare and Medicaid. Fully 75 percent, or $202 billion out of a total 1974 budget of $268.7 billion, consists of such "virtually uncontrollable" items, according to the President's report. Nor should it be supposed that all the social programs reduced or terminated are estimable by anyone's standard. Housing subsidies and manpower training, for example, have generally failed as now constituted, although the problems to which they were addressed remain urgent. Nevertheless, a sum of more than $14 billion is abolished in 1974 appropriations for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

various projects in education, manpower training, health, environmental care, housing and public assistance, with a further reduction of around $19 billion promised for 1975. An additional two billion dollars is sliced from agricultural programs, though Midwestern congressmen will no doubt fight this doggedly.

In contrast, national defense appropriations are expanded from $76.4 billion in 1973 to $81.1 billion in 1974 despite the end of our shooting in Vietnam, the reduction in military installations in Europe, and the arms limitation agreements already made or in the offing with the Soviet Union. Nor are there any reductions at all in the specific tax benefits generously accorded business, such as accelerated amortization, which some estimate as totaling $20 billion or more. On the contrary, a new tax break of four billion dollars was added last year and is herewith extended—a 25 percent tax credit to business on wages paid to newly hired "disadvantaged" workers. But then business and military activities, through orders to industry, contribute to the gross national product, yielding definitely quantifiable dollar returns. Can the same be said for cleaning the Hudson, the Potomac, or the Mississippi? Can investments in mental health or schooling survive that hardnosed test? Not by the measuring rod Mr. Nixon is determined to use. In his press conference last week he gave no quarter. He will continue to impound appropriated funds; if Congress wants to "overspend" let it raise taxes.

The tenor of the President's budget message was no more evident in its provisions than in what he said about them. The polls show that most Americans are worried more about inflation, taxes and crime than anything else. The President takes the nation's concerns as he finds them, as does Dr. Gallup, and addresses them with all the eloquence he can muster. As for crime, he reiterates his resolve of the past four years to stop it, unabashed by the accompanying crescendo over this period of rapes, murders and muggings. Specifically, he reaffirms his faith in special revenue sharing with the states and cities—of $2.6 billion—to do the job. Concerning inflation and taxes, the President virtually writes a book, for these are the issues he considers central to his entire economic program.

COMING: Why divorces cost
$1000 in Sacramento,
$250 in Denver
and $600 in New Canaan

To combat inflation, the President indicates that he is placing all his marbles on austerity in government outlays. For the current fiscal year of 1973 he counts on Congress, and his own impounding of appropriated funds, to hold total federal expenditures to $250 billion. If all goes as planned, then, the budgetary deficit this year will be $25 billion, about the same as in fiscal 1972. For fiscal 1974 the President recommends total outlays of $268.7 billion, and once again brusquely cautions Congress not to exceed the limit. Assuming that Congress obliges, the budgetary deficit would be cut in half, for a drop of about $12 billion. This, in sum total, is his answer to inflation. Enthusiastic prognostications of its success, so far as we know, are limited to Treasury Secretary Shultz, Economic Council Chairman Stein, and one or two other administration officers authorized to express themselves publicly.

For over the past 12 months the price level has shown increasing exuberance, the strength of which is not likely to be sapped by the recent dismantling of wage and price controls under Phase III. Meanwhile, the force of the business boom, now underway, promises to swamp the slight restraint of the President's 1974 budget—the $12 billion deficit reduction. The administration's own Commerce Department predicts that business fixed investment alone will rise by some $10 billion over the year ahead. Added to this are a few billion more expected in inventory investment, an anticipated increase of $10 billion to $15 billion in state and local expenditures, and a leap forward already in progress in household outlays for consumer goods. While forecasting is an inexact art, few people on Wall Street or elsewhere are betting against more inflation—and not just of food prices.

How the administration will react, if prices start to gallop, is of course less predictable than the pace of business itself. One possibility—theoretically—is a return to wage and price controls, but such regulations have not proved effective in stormy economic weather as Secretary Shultz and the other economic chieftains know. A second possibility is a rise in taxes, opposed to which is the President's own unqualified stand against "suffocating the productive members of society with excessive tax rates." Only if Congress blatantly disregards his cautions on spending, can he gracefully renege, protesting that new taxes hurt him more than they do us, but . . . The third and more likely possible reaction, for which the administration would require the cooperation of the Federal Reserve, is monetary restraint. No one doubts that if the Fed clamps down on the expansion of money and credit it can stop inflation. What one may assert, based solidly on experience, is that neither monetary restraint nor a rise in taxes can stop inflation without tripping the economy from prosperity into recession. How to achieve and maintain high employment *without* inflation, however, is a question that does not get answered in the President's budget message.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That Elitist Conspiracy

Last December 29, stock in *The Washington Post* company sold at $38 a share—a high for the news conglomerate which owns not only the nation's capital's major newpaper, but also three television stations, two radio stations and *Newsweek* magazine. The *Post* company earnings, which had some rough periods the past few years, seemed on their way up. Four days later, when the stock market reopened after the New Year's holiday, *Post* stock fell more than a dollar. The next day it dropped again and within two weeks it had slumped to $28 a share—a loss of 25 percent of the company's market value.

The cause of the precipitous drop was simple to diagnose—the renewal of broadcast licenses of the *Post*'s two profitable Florida television stations in Jacksonville and Miami was being challenged by no less than four separate groups who disclosed their filings with the Federal Communications Commission just before the January 2 deadline. Three years ago, when a single group of Nixon associates challenged the *Post*'s original purchase of the Miami station, the resultant legal maneuvering cost the Washington organization over $190,000. This time the *Post* will be lucky to get off for under $500,000 in a hearing that could go on for years.

Despite protests of the challengers that they were operating alone, there were signs that the White House was aware if not directly involved in the challenge. The former general counsel of the Committee to Reelect the President, Glenn J. Sedam, Jr., took part in some organization discussions prior to the Jacksonville filings and put one of the groups in touch with his old Washington law firm for representation before the FCC. Another of the Jacksonville challengers is headed by George Champion, Jr., the Nixon campaign's chief fundraiser in Florida. The Miami challenge is headed by Cromwell A. Anderson, one of the pro-Nixon businessmen who filed and then withdrew from a challenge three years ago. Anderson and another in his challenge group are law partners of former Democratic Senator George Smathers, a close Nixon friend. A third member of their group, hotel owner Edward N. Claughton, Jr., made his home available to Vice President Agnew during last year's GOP convention in Miami.

There is a question whether some of the challengers seriously hope to get control of the stations or whether they are cooperating in an effort to harass the *Post* organization. In support of the latter position is the fact that one of the challenging companies was not chartered by the state of Florida until December 29, the last Friday before the January 2 filing date. Washington communications lawyers say that groups seriously challenging a licensee for a property worth several million dollars, spend considerably more than a week or two putting together their proposal.

One part of the challenge filing is a survey of community attitudes to determine what potential viewers consider to be the problem areas television should explore. Most often these surveys are conducted by professional polling organizations using statistically balanced samples of the community. George Champion's Jacksonville challenge group, though financed by several millionaires, submitted a survey conducted by high school and college students making random interviews in Jacksonville shopping centers and parks. In the results, which were analyzed by Champion himself, it was noted that of 498 "face to face interviews," 13 were reported of "unknown" race and three of "unknown" sex.

In private conversations, White House sources are less reserved about the filings. One referred back to a preelection statement by former Attorney General John Mitchell who, when asked about a *Post* Watergate story which linked him to the cash fund that paid for the bugging episode said: "All that crap, you're puttin' it in the paper? It's all been denied . . . Katie Graham [Katherine Graham, owner of the *Post*] is gonna get her tit caught in a big fat wringer if that's published . . . You fellows got a great ball game going. As soon as you're finished paying Ed Williams [the *Post*'s lawyer], we're going to do a story on you."

Another suggested that the Florida filings were only the beginning of an economic campaign against the *Post*. "They plan to go after their [TV] advertising next," he said, "and squeeze her [Katherine Graham] tighter and tighter." A third White House intimate called the filing part of a war. If you accept the *Post*'s Watergate coverage during the election campaign as journalistic warfare, this is the retaliation.

Post officials say for the record they don't see direct White House involvement. Some even *hope* the administration is not calling the tune for they were hurt enough by the short-term stock drop (prices recovered slightly after announcement that the *Post* plans to buy another TV station, this time in Hartford). Confirmation of Nixon staff support for the challenge could make more costly their efforts to raise funds for the new station and guarantee that the current challenges will continue as long as Nixon is in office.

The *Post*, however, is not just the target of an isolated vendetta in response to the Watergate stories. It is part of a broader economic war against aggressive, independent (and anti-Nixon) journalism that is the enemy of the top Nixon staff. It is a war with a philosophical rationale: rid the country of a small clique of Eastern journalists who support neither major party (they attacked President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey and other traditional Democrats) and stand only for what Pat Moynihan once described as the "cult of disparagement."

Kevin Phillips, who has explored the question with White House aides, wrote recently of the "anti-Middle American elite, [which] by dint of its New York-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington TV network, news magazine and news service stranglehold, set the tone, and this tone is the Administration's target . . . not the press *per se* but a special subculture." The idea that this "subculture," which is "hostile to the nation's prevalent middle-class values" exerts enormous influence is traced by Phillips—and the White House—to its aggregation of economic power concentrated in New York and Washington and represented by the three networks, *The Washington Post* and *New York Times* companies. The wealth of these companies, the argument goes, enables them to indulge in news departments that are isolated from the mores of the general public. And those news departments in turn have been staffed by the "liberal elitists," practitioners of "ideological plugola" and "advocacy journalism" referred to in the past by Vice President Agnew, Clay Whitehead, Charles Colson and other administration spokesmen.

The White House staff has outside support. They have been told, for example, that their moving against the networks and the big Eastern media chains can be compared to populist crusades of the past—against the national banks, the railroads and the utilities. On January 10, at a special White House seminar for key domestic staffers, Herman Kahn delighted them with his statement on the media. "While skepticism of much of the establishment and its institutions remains an important issue," read Kahn's notes for the meeting entitled "Future U. S. Scenario," "as far as the country as a whole is concerned, the biggest credibility gap is between the average man and the prestige press, partly because the prestige press did not seem to understand the domestic affairs of the '60s and partly because (as the Vietnamese outcome shows) it did not understand foreign affairs either . . . readers . . . are increasingly skeptical of the prestige press."

Criticism by administration officials along with threats of subpoenas and harassment of individual newsmen have been only one element in the anti-media crusade. Legislative and administrative changes in security classification systems which will affect Washington coverage have been encouraged. As the move against the *Post* stations illustrates, cutting down the economic power of the "subculture" media groups is also a basic priority.

Here, the prime thrust has been at the networks. Shortly after the ITT scandal, the Justice Department filed a longstanding antitrust suit against the networks' practice of producing and owning their own shows. Originally put together under Democratic administrations, the suit is less valid today when networks produce less and less of their own material. Nonetheless, it requires network attention and funds. The White House is also pressing a plan to limit network reruns, thus adding to program production costs. In another anti-network move, individual station owners are being offered a bill which would give them longer-term licenses in return for their increased involvement in national programming—a move designed to tone down anti-administration news coverage.

In a recent television discussion, White House aide Charles Colson, an architect of the administration's media crusade, remarked that network power would be further eroded by new communications technology, particularly cable television and video cassettes. Clay Whitehead and a cabinet-level committee on cable TV are expected to emerge soon with recommendations for federal promotion of the cable industry. Federal money passed out through HEW and HUD have financed numerous experiments for cable usage. And Whitehead's own office has financed at least one study into means for government to use cable and cassettes to get its information to the public, bypassing network television and other existing media. HEW has just put out a contract to study education telecommunications for future Office of Education support, including "alternative telecommunication system configurations."

As one White House observer puts it, "the economic and technological pressure is being kept up on the networks with the government providing the horsepower."

The New York Times has been having its own financial problems apart from any economic mischief created from the White House. Its stock, brought out several years ago at $53, now sells for $13 a share. Earnings growth depends on *Family Circle*, a women's magazine distributed in supermarkets—rather than on the newspaper. And for whatever reasons, the newspaper has lost a good deal of its critical reporting bite. The *Post* beat it soundly on Watergate and the *Times* has failed to take up with special concern such anti-administration stories as Roy Ash's potential conflict of interest and Litton Industries' navy contract. Only the columns of Tom Wicker and Anthony Lewis regularly provide the type of aggressive advocacy so deplored by the White House.

The networks make no bones about the fact that—except for ABC—they are hurting more than usual. Their stocks have dropped in the wake of uncertainty over administration and FCC policies. News department budgets have been reduced. However, although their combined critical output is not all that great, network news shows have not noticeably eased off on the administration and their commentators, particularly Walter Cronkite, Dan Rather of CBS and David Brinkley of NBC, carry on as they have in the past.

There is irony in the administration's anti-media campaign. In pressing for diversity to break the hold of the networks, they are also pushing a program long sought by liberals. As one network official recently noted, it was the liberal FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson who first asked to see which local stations *refused* to carry network public affairs documentaries so that he could use it against them at their renewal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hearings. How different, this network official asked, is the principle when Clay Whitehead threatens to make local stations responsible for the network news shows that they *do* carry? There is, of course, a difference, and it stems from a basic disagreement over what the role of a press in a free society is. Most journalists want diversity so that conflicting views can be aired and discussed. But they also see merit and strength for our system in news media that are basically skeptical of government claims on power, no matter which party holds office.

Abortion

The Constitution, said Justice Holmes in a famous dissent in 1905, "is made for people of fundamentally differing views." Very seldom, therefore, do the Constitution's text and its history return a single comprehensive answer to questions of social and economic policy. When he wrote those words, the justices were grinding out annual answers to social and economic questions on the basis of their own convictions of what was wise—derived, as it happens, from the laissez-faire philosophy of Herbert Spencer. That would not do, Holmes told them, and it did not, although it took 30 years for a majority of the justices to see it and Holmes was gone by then.

Nobody has since reread Herbert Spencer into the Constitution, but in the 1960s, a majority of the justices, under Earl Warren, again began dictating answers to social and sometimes economic problems. The problems now were not regulation of economic enterprise, not labor relations, but the structure of politics, educational policy, the morals and mores of the society. And the answers were differently derived, not from the *Social Statics* of Herbert Spencer, but from more fashionable and perhaps humane notions of progress. Again, it seems, it may take some time before the realization comes that this will not do. On January 22, the Supreme Court, paying formal tribute to Holmes' 1905 dissent, but violating its spirit, undertook to settle the abortion issue. Most states have abortion statutes. They are not uniform in their provisions. Some are old and some are new. All are currently in controversy and in flux. In their place, the Supreme Court has now prescribed a virtually uniform statute of its own, allowing very little variation. During the first three months of pregnancy, the Court decreed, a woman and her physician may decide on an abortion quite free of any interference from the state, except as the physician may be required himself to be licensed by the state. During the second three months, the state may impose some health regulations, but it may not forbid abortion. During the last three months, the state may if it chooses forbid as well as regulate.

That may be a wise model statute, although there is considerable question why the Court foreclosed state regulation of the places where the abortion is to be performed. The state regulates and licenses restaurants and pool halls and Turkish baths, and God knows what else in order to protect the public, and it is difficult to see why it may not similarly regulate and license abortion clinics, or doctors' offices, if abortions are to be performed in them. In any case, with this and perhaps one or another exception, the Court's model statute is an intelligent one. But what is the justification for its imposition on the country by the Court? If this statute, why not one on proper grounds for divorce, or on adoption of children or on anything you please?

There is a body of medical evidence now in existence, the Court tells us, showing that abortions during the first three months of pregnancy present no great risk. Well and good. It is also clear that the fetus is not a life in being at the early stages of pregnancy, and is not entitled to constitutional protection. The constitution cannot be construed to forbid abortion. Well and good. But the fetus is a potential life, and the Court acknowledges that society has a legitimate interest in it as such. And so does the individual—the woman and perhaps also the father—and the individual interest may be characterized as a claim to personal privacy, which in some contexts, all of them markedly different, the Constitution has been found to protect. The individual interest, the Court holds, completely overrides the interest of society in the first three months of pregnancy, and subject only to health regulations, also in the second. In the third trimester, society is in charge again.

Why? The Court never says. It simply asserts the result it has reached. That is all the Court can do because there is no answer that moral philosophy, logic, reason or other materials of law can give to this question. If medical considerations were the only ones involved, perhaps a satisfactory rational answer could be arrived at. But as the Court acknowledges, they are not. That is why the question is not for courts, but should have been left to the political process, which in state after state can achieve not one but many accommodations and adjust them from time to time as attitudes change.

There were, astonishingly enough, only two dissenters—Justices White and Rehnquist. The Court's decision is an "extravagant exercise" of judicial power, said Justice White; it is a legislative rather than judicial action, suggested Justice Rehnquist. So it is, and if the Court's guess concerning the probable and desirable direction of progress is wrong, it will nevertheless have been imposed on all 50 states, and imposed permanently, unless the Court itself should in future change its mind. Normal legislation, enacted by legislatures rather than judges, is happily not so rigid, and not so presumptuous in its claims to universality and permanence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Slamming the Door

Lyndon Johnson had been dead only two days before a brief news story foretold the impending end of the headquarters of the war on poverty. Sure enough, when the President's 1974 budget was published last week, there was nothing in it for the Office of Economic Opportunity.

In March 1964 when Lyndon Johnson presented the Economic Opportunity Act to Congress, he said, "Today, for the first time in our history, we have the power to strike away the barriers to full participation in our society. Having the power, we have the duty." To do the job he asked Congress for "a lever with which we can begin to open the door to our prosperity for those who have been kept outside." That lever was OEO, an executive office outside the massive, lumbering Departments of HEW and Labor. Because it was an independent agency of the White House, OEO was supposed to be pushy, experimental, not timid about starting projects that would poach on other's territory, nor timid about dropping them if they failed. When an idea worked, OEO was supposed to hand it over to the big departments so that they might institutionalize it. The key was *vigor*—that favorite word of the Kennedys—and OEO could be vigorous only as long as the President wanted it to be.

Nine years later, those promises seem overblown, even fantastic. Another war with its inflation intervened and drained away much of the nation's vigor and dollars that might have been channeled into the OEO campaign. The census reported in 1970 that since 1960 an additional 1.2 million Americans had fallen into the federally defined class of the poor. Was it really possible that a President in 1964 had proposed a war whose objective was "total victory . . . the eradication of poverty"?

The enemies of OEO have been waiting a long time to do exactly what President Nixon has proposed. When Johnson's bill reached Congress in 1964, the Republicans called it a "gimmick," a "hodgepodge" of loosely drawn projects. Mississippi Democrat John Bell Williams was so disturbed that he attached an amendment in the Senate requiring every Job Corps trainee and VISTA worker to sign a pledge of loyalty to the US government. Last week in his budget, Nixon recommended putting the various offices of OEO back into the departments from which they had come, or where they might fit in, eliminating just a few. Surely he had OEO in mind when he referred to "a hodgepodge of independent, organizationally unrelated offices that pursue interrelated goals."

Under the new scheme, some branches of OEO will be placed in HEW, some in Labor and perhaps one in Commerce. Congress will not fight these changes, particularly if the President submits them for routine approval as part of his executive reorganization plan. Those who handle antipoverty legislation forsee no "net loss" except in three cases: elimination of a $30 million emergency standby food and health operation and a possible cut in funds for OEO's Economic Development and Community Action Offices. The last mentioned, which received $328 million in federal funds last year, is considered the heart of OEO. It is the office that finds and approves grant money (about one billion dollars annually) for nearly 1000 local self-help enterprises around the country. Nixon would like to turn this task over in its entirety to state governments, but Congress may decide to continue funding it.

At the moment, the most vulnerable segment of OEO appears to be the Office of Legal Services; there's no provision for it in the reorganization plan. The administration is supposedly writing a new bill to place the 2000 or so "poverty lawyers" under the direction of an independent corporation financed by the government, but not responsible to it. This idea became the chief issue in a bitter contest last year between congressmen who wanted to preserve the political integrity of legal services and the administration, which wanted authority to choose every director of the proposed guiding corporation.

Although 80 percent of the cases handled by poverty lawyers deal with mundane domestic problems, about 10 percent deal with the rights of the poor as a class. Some of these cases have infuriated state governors. Understandably, they resent having their budget cuts and welfare "reforms" frustrated by young OEO lawyers who are paid by the federal government to defend the poor. Governor Reagan of California, for example, has been trying to restrict the domain of legal services for more than five years, without great success. For this reason, those who see legal services as the most successful part of OEO are skeptical about the President's offer to create an independent corporation. Some believe that with the elimination of OEO, the administration may be in the position to ask for whatever it wants in the way of a legal services corporation. If that is so, Congress may have to choose between an emasculated program or none at all. It is the only major question involving OEO's future which the Senate seems ready to fight about.

In the Public Interest

Thalidomide Children

It has been more than a decade since the world learned that a sedative drug called thalidomide, taken by pregnant women, had resulted in the birth of about 10,000 horribly deformed, limbless babies in a dozen countries, mostly West Germany, England and Japan. There are about 400 thalidomide children in England. Most of them still have received no compensation for their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

injuries and maintenance from the giant Distillers Corporation which produced and marketed the drug, under the trade name Distaval, as "completely safe for pregnant women and nursing mothers."

In 1971, Distillers, whose profits exceeded $150 million last year, made a bloc offer of $7.8 million for settling all the cases. Under great financial duress, most of the parents were ready to accept this paltry sum which averaged $20,000 per child. A few parents refused, however, and Distillers imperiously stated that unless all accepted the offer would be withdrawn. The company's bargaining power was enhanced by the utterly archaic state of English law for awarding justice to victims of hazardous consumer products.

The tide finally began to move against Distillers last September when the *London Sunday Times* began publishing a series of articles about the entire thalidomide tragedy and the behavior of Distillers. The company filed suit and obtained an injunction against the *Times* to stop a forthcoming article, arguing that it would prejudice the case in court. This move, of course, only heightened interest in the case among the British press. Events began to move quickly. Spontaneous boycotting of Distillers products, which include such well-known whiskies as Johnny Walker, Haig, Dewars, Vat 69 and Booth's, Gordon's and Tanqueray gin, converged with public criticism by several large institutional shareholders of the company. On December 14, Distillers raised its offer to $28 million over 10 years provided the government permit it tax deductibility. The furor intensified as the government rejected this attempt to make the taxpayer bear a large portion of the financial burden. Several supermarket chains announced they were boycotting Distillers products. Major banks and insurance companies associated with the company publicly criticized the inadequate offer.

Early this month, Alexander McDonald, the crusty accountant who heads Distillers' multinational operations, was called to London by the financial establishment and given some advice. Make a better offer, he was advised, or this matter could lead to more government regulation and a boycott of Distillers products in other countries, notably the United States. On January 5, McDonald announced an offer of $51 million spread over a 10-year period, or about an average of $120,000 for each victim.

By comparison, in the United States a thalidomide child received $800,000 in one case. Other children received settlements far in excess of Distillers' latest offer from Richardson-Merrell, the American drug company which clinically tested thalidomide on a few pregnant mothers before the Food and Drug Administration moved to block sale in this country.

In West Germany and Scandinavia, the culpable companies, Chemie Grunenthal and AB Astraa, finally agreed to payments even lower than the latest Distillers offer. But in other countries the children have received nothing. In Ireland at least 84 thalidomide children have been located. They and their parents have received nothing. The German company, Chemie Grunenthal, offered the hard-pressed parents several hundred to a few thousand dollars provided they bring their children to Germany for inspection. In Japan, where there are more than 1000 thalidomide children, and in Argentina, Italy, Brazil and other nations, less is known about the children.

Citizen pressure has had an impact on Distillers. But more needs to be done to assemble the facts and secure justice for children in England and other countries. Anyone who wishes to join this consumer effort may write to my associate, Donald Ross, P.O. Box 14189, Washington, DC 20044.

Ralph Nader

The Nixon Watch

Games with Topsy

Before getting to the main business of the day in the White House press room on January 26, Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler threw his engaging smile at the assembled reporters and said that he "would like to make one or two points, points that have perhaps not been presented clearly enough in the past."

When Ziegler introduces his remarks in that tone of implied apology for past derelictions, a reasonable assumption is that he has been told by H. R. Haldeman, the assistant in charge of White House management and in ultimate charge of a great deal else, including the care and improvement of the Nixon image, to get out there and set those jerks in the media straight on any line of news reporting and comment that may, at a given moment, be vexing Haldeman and his only superior in the White House hierarchy, the President. Ziegler's remarks on this occasion indicated that the President and Haldeman were vexed by the tendency of reporters and commentators to harp on a point that Mr. Nixon himself had made in the following words on November 27: "The White House staff has grown rather like Topsy. It has grown in every administration. It is now time to reverse the growth . . ." Arguing that the President was right and the journalists were wrong when he and they said in different ways that the White House staff had grown like Topsy during the Nixon years was a difficult assignment. But, for reasons that can be explained only by dragging the reader through a morass of figures and bureaucratic technicalities, the press secretary was able to sustain his argument with less deception than he is capable of practicing when he is ordered or chooses to do so.

The irritation that Ziegler reflected dates back to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the first weeks of the Nixon tenure in early 1969 (when I, for example, wrote that Mr. Nixon had already installed "the biggest and most elaborate array of assistants, assistants to assistants, councils and sub-councils in presidential history"). The suffering in and near Mr. Nixon's Oval Office was acute in early 1973 because reports of this kind made it appear that the President was undoing what he had done in his first four years when he had his press spokesman and Roy Ash, the new director of the Office of Management and Budget, announce his first moves to chop down both his immediate staff and the staffs of the catch-all Executive Office of the President. "I think it is important," Ziegler said on the 26th, "that we put that into perspective. We are not decreasing an increase that has been put into effect by this Administration . . . I keep seeing stories that during the Nixon Administration, or (an interesting change!) during President Nixon's Administration, the White House staff has been increased or the Executive Office of the President had been doubled. That is incorrect." The thrust of the press secretary's frequently repeated statements to the same effect was that what he called "the White House staff itself, the President's personal staff" had not increased at all and was being reduced from 147 functional assistants last November to around 90 by mid-1973. As for total employment in the encompassing Executive Office, it had decreased from 4700 in June of 1968 to 4250 in June of 1972 and would be cut to under 2000 by June of 1973.

How this last was to be accomplished was the meat of the news that Roy Ash was trotted out to announce after two hours of coaching by a team of White House publicists. They went to such lengths to prepare him because his few previous appearances before the White House press and the White House staff had encouraged an impression that Director Ash, whatever his talents in management and organizational reform may be, is an unsurpassed mumbler of meaningless profundities when he seeks to enlighten people in groups. Either the coaching was marvelously effective or the impression was false. He dealt crisply and clearly with the President's plans to remove 389 employees from the Executive Office payroll by abolishing the moribund National Aeronautics and Space Council, shifting the advisory functions of the Office of Science and Technology to the National Science Foundation, and transferring the responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness for disaster relief, civil survival during nuclear attack, imports that might affect national security, and oil imports policy to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the General Services Administration and the Treasury. Ash also confirmed without announcing the President's intention—Congress willing, which is uncertain—to abolish the federal government's central anti-poverty agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and thereby accomplish most of the promised cut of some 2200 in the Executive Office rosters. Excepting the space council, for which there has never been much demonstrable need, there are good arguments against the changes and grounds for suspecting that a major purpose is simply to give the presidential establishment the lean and efficient look that Mr. Nixon desires. It must be acknowledged, however, that Roy Ash earned respect when he said, with the zeal of a true believer in organizational magic, that the purpose of these and forthcoming changes is to limit "the realm of the President's office to policy making" and to "preserve its special perspective, its special strength to determine policy, to assign responsibilities, to coordinate inter-agency activities and to oversee all agency operations." With his reference to overseeing "all agency operations," he certainly hit the mark. Strengthened presidential oversight and command of all federal activities, with the command centered at the White House, is the primary purpose of the entire second-term exercise in organizational reform.

And now, with appropriate shudders, back to the Nixon-Ziegler numbers game. The President's spokesman sustained his argument that there really has been no increase in "the White House staff, the President's personal staff" by sticking strictly to two entities, the Executive Office of the President and a unit within it that is called "the White House Office." This last is indeed the core of the President's staff. It is approximately true that the recent level of White House Office employment cited by Ziegler—510 authorized permanent employees, representing an actual total of about 600 and including clerical and other "support" personnel in addition to the functional assistants—is about what it was in 1968. But there's a catch: the larger Executive Office embraces five presidential offices and councils (telecommunications policy, domestic affairs, drug abuse, economic controls, environmental quality) that didn't exist in 1968. All of them are staffed and all of them serve the President in staff capacities. In December, they employed 550 functional assistants and supporting personnel. Their staffs are being reduced, along with the White House Office staff, but in mid-1973 they still will add some 450 White House employees to the authorized and publicized total of 480 White House Office employees. It is in these new Nixon offices and councils, and in Henry Kissinger's National Security Council, with a staff that has doubled since 1968 and is to be reduced very little if at all, that the White House establishment has grown "rather like Topsy" since Mr. Nixon took over.

Thirty of the 47 White House Office assistants who quit that staff in November and December got other government assignments. Four of them actually remained on the overall Nixon staff, at the Office of Management and Budget and with the Council on International Economic Policy. The reduction of 389 re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sulting from abolition of the space council, the Office of Science and Technology and the Office of Emergency Preparedness meant a net cut of only 66 in federal employment because OEP's 323 "permanent" employees are to be transferred to the agencies taking on its functions. Two of several White House Office assistants who haven't quit yet but are going to are Dwight Chapin, the President's appointments man, and Herbert Klein, the director of Communications. The circumstances of their impending departures attest to the sour atmosphere that prevails at the Nixon White House behind the show of happy progress toward lean efficiency. Chapin is leaving because of his uncomfortably close association with the sabotage and other skullduggery that marred the Nixon campaign for reelection. Klein, who has served the President since the 1950s, has been invited out in order to clear the way for a planned reorganization and concentration of the entire White House news and propaganda operation under Ronald Ziegler. Working for Mr. Nixon these days isn't quite the fun it was when it all started four years ago.

John Osborne

The Tenuous Peace

Reconciliation?

by Stanley Karnow

Saigon

Events here since the cease-fire agreement was signed in Paris may augur the shape of things to come in South Vietnam during the months ahead. Vice President Agnew's visit, which was largely contrived to reassure South Vietnamese President Thieu, suggests that the Nixon administration intends to continue supporting the Saigon regime. Prolonged hostilities on the ground for days after the cease-fire accord indicate that fighting of one kind or another is likely to erupt recurrently despite the presence of commissions designed to supervise the peace. Most striking perhaps is the attitude of the Saigon population. People have greeted the Paris agreement with neither enthusiasm nor confidence. There have been no cheering crowds or dancing in the streets. If citizens have put out flags, they have done so on orders of the police.

This mood of caution partly reflects the understandable prudence of people who have known nothing but war for 30 years, and who have time and again seen their dreams evaporate. Their subdued reaction also mirrors their exhaustion. Furthermore, they are being told by Thieu that the conflict is not finished.

In his statement proclaiming the cease-fire, President Nixon used the word "peace" 31 times, and he repeatedly referred to an honorable peace, a durable peace, a peace that heals. Thieu, in contrast, has conspicuously avoided mention of peace. "This agreement is so far only a cease-fire treaty, no more and no less," he emphasized at the outset. And he has since stressed that the fight would continue in other forms. "A new phase is opened in the war resistance of the South Vietnamese people," he has said. "The new phase is the phase of political struggle aimed at preventing the Communists from defeating us."

Judging from his behavior within recent days, Thieu clearly has no intention of encouraging a reconciliation with the Vietcong. His propagandists continue to assert that the Vietcong must be killed, and these assertions are being matched by government directives. Thieu has instructed his soldiers and police to arrest "neutralist and pro-Communist elements" who try to engage in "political activities." Those who promote "anarchy" will also be jailed or shot if they resist arrest. The press will remain under strict government control. Except for Thieu's own "Democratic Party," political movements are prohibited. If elections are held, he insists, they must conform to his constitution.

There is a possibility, some sources here believe, that Thieu may even move quickly to hold a referendum in order to reinforce his authority. Since his army controls most of the population—the result of the bombing policy that forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into urban areas—Thieu would emerge with an overwhelming victory.

The Vietcong, on the other hand, appears to be planning to pursue a more flexible strategy. If reports of its planned design are accurate, the Vietcong will focus on the theme of reconciliation, unity and peace. Consistent with this strategy, Vietcong cadres are already reported to be urging people to put out the national flag rather than their own colors. The Vietcong is also said to be making contact with anti-Communist elements hostile to Thieu. Its aim, quite plainly, is to isolate Thieu and, in so doing, to win over the sympathy of the population.

What will make possible the continuation of the political struggle—and perhaps a revival of guerrilla warfare—is the ambiguity of the complicated cease-fire agreement. The accord could not have been reached had it not been vague, since both the United States and the North Vietnamese were unwilling to lock themselves into tight legalities. But the fuzziness of the document makes it virtually certain to be violated.

The International Control and Supervisory Commission, with only 1000 Canadian, Indonesian, Polish and Hungarian representatives, is obviously too small to maintain the peace. And like its predecessor, the International Control Commission created by the 1954 Geneva Conference, the present group must function on

STANLEY KARNOW, *former diplomatic correspondent of* The Washington Post, *reports for NBC.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the basis of unanimity. This means that the Poles and Hungarians can overlook Vietcong infractions, and the Canadians and Indonesians can disregard Saigon government violations, thereby paralyzing investigations. Thieu's view of the commission was underlined in the remark the other day of his press spokesman, Hoang Dun Nha: "We welcome the commission, but the South Vietnamese people must assure their own security."

The same difficulties are expected to bedevil the four-power military commission composed of American, Saigon, North Vietnamese and Vietcong representatives. The task of this commission is to investigate violations of the cease-fire and, through the close relationship of its representatives with the two sides, persuade them to keep the peace. The procedure may look plausible on paper. But nobody here realistically expects the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong members of the commission to admonish violations of the cease-fire by North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops. Nor would the United States and Saigon members lay blame on Thieu's soldiers.

As for the passages in the agreement calling for a political settlement by the South Vietnamese themselves, Thieu has already made it clear that he will not compromise. Among other things, he insists that the estimated 145,000 North Vietnamese troops in the South be withdrawn before a political accommodation can be reached. He also refuses to recognize the Vietcong as the provisional revolutionary government, and he has openly declared that he will strive to restrict the authority of the so-called National Council of Reconciliation and Concord—if it is ever created.

The Vietcong is likely to act tough on legalistic points, as its representatives demonstrated when they landed in Saigon last week. They refused to sign immigration forms bearing the imprint of the "Republic of Vietnam" on the grounds that this constituted recognition of a separate Southern state. They stubbornly sat on their aircraft overnight until a face-saving formula was reached. The North Vietnamese delegation, significantly, raised no such fuss.

Thieu has been strengthening himself in anticipation of a breakdown in the cease-fire. Since October, when he rejected the earlier agreement, the United States has given him one billion dollars worth of new equipment, including 300 new helicopters, three squadrons of F5Es, four regiments of M-48 tanks and three frigates. A program to recruit an estimated 10,000 American civilian technicians is also underway. And, of course, Thieu can rely on the American aircraft in Thailand or offshore should the war be rekindled. The presumption is that the Vietcong will build up its force as well and concentrate on securing its supply routes from North Vietnam into the South.

But if the cease-fire agreement does not promise the durable peace hailed by Nixon, it will have two achievements to its credit within the next two months. It will have provided for the withdrawal of the remaining American ground troops and the release of the American prisoners of war. The question for the future, however, is whether Vietnam will be relegated to the obscurity it so richly deserves, to borrow Galbraith's phrase, or whether the renewed hostilities that are bound to erupt tempt a renewed US involvement.

It Doesn't Need Its Cases "Screened"
One Supreme Court

by Arthur J. Goldberg

A study group of eminent legal scholars and lawyers, headed by Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School and appointed by the chief justice of the United States, has recently recommended a major change in the structure of our judicial system. After examining the work load of the Supreme Court, the group concluded that the rising case load has imposed a "staggering burden" upon the justices. It proposes a national court of appeals, made up of a rotating panel of seven currently sitting federal appellate judges. This court would read the 3600 or so petitions that are filed each year requesting Supreme Court review of a case; it would deny most of these petitions, while passing on about 400 of them to the Supreme Court itself for further screening and decision. The new court would

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG *is a former associate justice of the Supreme Court.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also hear and determine on the merits cases involving conflicts among the federal courts of appeal, a function traditionally performed by the Supreme Court.

Despite my respect and regard for the members of the study group, I do not support its major recommendation. Judging from my own experience and observation, the statement that "overwork" requires a major change in the jurisdictional authority of the Supreme Court suffers from what Churchill used to call "terminological inexactitude."

I do not challenge the case load figures that the group has collected and recognize that the Court's work load has increased significantly since I left the Court in 1965. The number of filed cases that the Court must screen has risen dramatically—from fewer than 1000 filed in 1935 to 3643 filed in 1971. But I am of the view that petition screening, though highly important, represents one of the less time-consuming aspects of a justice's work. The vast majority of *certiorari* petitions raises no significant legal issue and, under existing legislation, the Court has discretion to deny petitions without hearing or formal opinions. Indeed, an astonishing number of filed cases raises questions that a third-year law student can immediately recognize as inappropriate for the Supreme Court. It is generally known that not more than 10 or 15 percent of the petitions now filed require extensive consideration, and the study group's proposal would have the Supreme Court consider that number in any event.

On the other hand, the more historically important and time-consuming aspect of a justice's work—the hearing and determination of cases on the merits—has not become correspondingly more burdensome over the years. The number of decided cases has remained relatively constant, varying roughly between 90 and 140 annually, since 1935.

During my service on the Court, between 2300 and 2400 cases were filed each year. As I have mentioned, since then the number of cases filed has increased substantially. But this increase is in substantial part due to the increased number of *habeas corpus* petitions filed by prisoners. Relatively few of these raise significant legal issues. The pressure these petitions place upon the Court should diminish provided society finds other and superior methods to deal with the prisoners' complaints that many of these petitions present.

Further, the study group makes constructive proposals that should diminish the number of *habeas* petitions that the Court must review. These proposals would give prisoners the benefit of an ombudsman, rather than an untutored "prison lawyer" to advise them as to their prospects of success in seeking review by the Court. More important, recent decisions curbing the unfettered discretion of parole boards and ensuring fair and equal consideration of parole applications will greatly help in eliminating the pressure for *habeas corpus* proceedings.

Since I was a member of the Court, most justices have increased their staff of law clerks from two to three. Law clerks are helpful to the justices in summarizing and digesting for them *certiorari* petitions and researching argued cases. This increase in the number of law clerks itself should be a help to the Court in screening cases for review. But having said this, I also want to emphasize, on the basis of my experience, that every justice does his own work and makes his own decisions, whether in passing on applications for *certiorari* or in deciding argued cases. I agree, of course, that the responsibility of justices of the Court must not be delegated. In my experience it was not, and I am confident that it is not being delegated today.

I am not convinced by the group's report that the increase in the Court's work load requires a delegation of authority to a newly created court. I share Justice Stewart's view, as reported in the *Harvard Law Record* a few weeks ago, that "the very heavy case load is neither intolerable nor impossible to handle." This view has been expressed also in a Supreme Court opinion by Justice Douglas.

Even apart from my doubts as to the immediate need for a national court of appeals, I believe the proposal suffers a number of serious drawbacks. First, one cannot be certain that the views of a rotating group of appellate court judges about which cases are important will resemble those of all, or a majority, of the Supreme Court justices. Courts of appeal are bound by Supreme Court precedents. If these are to be overruled, only the Supreme Court is authorized to do so. Thus, for example, in 1964, when I raised the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty in a dissent in the case of *Rudolph v. Alabama*, no judge of the court of appeals had voiced doubts on this score for the simple reason that prior decisions of the Supreme Court sustained the death penalty. If the *Rudolph* case had not reached the Supreme Court on a petition of *certiorari* because a group of appellate judges considered it "settled" that the death penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment, would I have been able to find an appropriate case to raise the matter and to encourage discussion of the question among the justices in conference and at the bar?

In due time, at the 1972 term, the Supreme Court itself, reversing prior decisions, held that the death penalty as applied was unconstitutional. Would *Furman v. Georgia* have reached the Supreme Court under the screening plan by appellate judges proposed in the study group report? Would *Brown v. Board of Education*? Would a national court of appeals have known that the Supreme Court was prepared to overrule *Betts v. Brady* and hold that impoverished criminal defendants must be given lawyers, or might it have dismissed the case of *Gideon v. Wainwright* before it reached the Supreme Court? Would Gideon's Trumpet have been heard? Would a national court of appeals have guessed properly that in *Baker v. Carr* the Supreme Court was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prepared first to reconsider and then to overrule prior recent decisions holding reapportionment to be a "political" rather than justiciable issue? Would a panel of appellate judges presume to conclude, as it did in *Mapp v. Ohio* (decided only 12 years after the Court held in *Wolf v. Colorado* that punishment of the policeman was the appropriate remedy against illegally seized evidence), that this sanction was unworkable and in order to vindicate Fourth Amendment rights such evidence should be excluded? These decisions are cited only by way of example; many others, old and recent, could be mentioned.

True, in some of these cases the Supreme Court had given some indications of possible reconsideration of its prior decisions. But would the signals be clear enough for appellate judges trained to respect precedents?

I strongly believe that a rotating panel of the court of appeals, by the very nature of their experience, cannot be sufficiently sensitive to matters of timing, progression, factual background or the internal dynamics of the Supreme Court to determine whether cases are suitable for full hearing and decision at a particular point in time. The intermediate judges, in their screening, would lack the necessary "feel" for what Supreme Court justices wish to hear. And it is this fact which may, at least in part, have led the founding fathers to insist that there be only "one Supreme Court."

Second, there is surely something to be said for having Supreme Court justices consider and occasionally decide inadequacies and conflicts of federal law. While the Court's primary function is to decide important constitutional questions, its decisions must be based upon a thorough knowledge of the law as a whole. To require justices to maintain a working familiarity with the myriad of cases that make up most of the body of the law and comprise much of the daily work of the lower courts tends to make their decisions more realistic and helps them to place important legal issues in the context of a vast existing body of law and judicial practice.

Further, and more important, the Court is the ultimate guardian of ensuring justice under law and in performance of this role is charged, along with its constitutional responsibilities, with supervising the lower federal courts in their decision-making. *Mallory v. US*, which held that a person charged with a crime must be promptly arraigned, was decided as an exercise of the Court's supervisory powers rather than on constitutional grounds. Yet, no one would deny the importance of this decision, which indeed has led to highly debatable legislation.

Third, the proposal violates the spirit and perhaps even the letter of the Constitution. Article Three of the Constitution provides for "one Supreme Court." To some extent Congress can alter the specific substantive areas that fall within the Court's appellate jurisdiction. But, once Congress vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, can it delegate to another court the responsibility of determining which cases the Supreme Court will hear? Does not the power to decide cases presuppose the power to determine what cases will be decided? In other words, is delegation of the "screening function" to a separate court consistent with the Constitution's command that there be "*one* Supreme Court"?

But, even if these constitutional doubts are not well founded, what the Constitution does not command, it may still inspire. There is the greatest value in citizens being able to believe that, as a matter of principle, every man and woman has a right to take a claim involving basic rights and liberties to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is this belief that in part inspires the great popular reverence for the Supreme Court in its role as a "palladium of liberty," and a "citadel of justice." Even though, as a practical matter, most claims will not strike the justices as significant enough to warrant plenary consideration, it is important to the sustenance of this view that litigants know that the justices have at least looked at, and evaluated, their claim, and that every citizen knows that he has the right to have the justices themselves pass upon his claim. I, for one, would not change this principle.

Further, it seems to me that alternative devices to handle the case load of the Supreme Court can more easily and less dangerously be created within the existing structure of the Court rather than by creating a new court. In my view, additional personnel to assist the Court in the handling of its case load would obviate the need for drastic change in our fundamental system of Supreme Court review, such as that proposed by the Freund group.

The study group has proposed a number of other changes that would reduce the Supreme Court's work load. I have not addressed myself to these less important changes; many of them make eminent sense. I cannot agree, however, with its proposal to create a national court of appeals.

It is perhaps the greatest virtue of the Supreme Court as it now functions that it serves as a guarantee to all citizens of whatever estate, race or color, that our highest court is open for consideration of their claim that equal and relevant justice under the Constitution is being denied them.

I believe that to create a national court of appeals would be a grave mistake. The committee's proposal would deny to Americans their historic right to take every case raising substantial constitutional questions to the highest court in the land.

I profoundly believe that the Supreme Court as it now functions in discharging its great responsibilities under the Constitution is the ultimate guardian of our liberties. Let us leave it so.

Alexander M. Bickel will comment on Justice Goldberg's argument in a forthcoming issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vietnam: Some Afterthoughts

The reason we cannot say the Indochina conflict is over is that no one has yet won it in the old-fashioned sense of a cease-fire accompanied by a surrender. It remains for the parties most directly concerned and most hostile to each other, to settle what was not settled on the battlefield. They do not now recognize each other's legal existence, and each is in occupation, however tenuous, of large parts of the same country. "When you have a guerrilla war," as President Nixon commented on January 27, 1969, "in which one side may not even be able to control many of those who are responsible for the violence in the area, the cease-fire may be meaningless." Nevertheless most bombing has stopped and there is a tapering off of the fighting.

It is hoped that the cease-fire can be adequately supervised by some 1100 international observers, half of whom are from Communist countries and all of whose decisions must be unanimous. But a 1968 Brookings Institution study pointed out that "a force of some 20,000 to 25,000 military personnel and civilian police would be needed to perform peace-keeping duties in Vietnam." The study went on to say that "if both sides . . . agreed to a cease-fire arrangement that is basically genuine and in good faith, however limited, several hundred thousand peace-keepers would be too many; if either side decides to overturn the agreement and resume fighting, several hundred thousand or a half-million peace-keepers would probably be too few to stop them." Judging from Stanley Karnow's report from Saigon in this issue and from numerous other dispatches, it seems improbable that President Thieu will soon agree to free "South Vietnam civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam," or that he will honor his pledge to "prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals and organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other; ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise."

We raise these points not to disparage the Paris agreement, but to suggest that the requisite good faith on all sides is not yet visible. It is prudent to prepare ourselves for the cheerless possibility that Thieu and his opponents will not be reconciled, and to ask what the United States government plans to do if repeated violations by either side are alleged, or indeed occur. We are reasonably sure that if the administration stands firm for peace, it will not connive in any attempt by Thieu to evade or sabotage the agreement, and equally sure that without that connivance Thieu could not for long get away with it. Having achieved the objective of US military withdrawal and the return of the POWs, Mr. Nixon doubtless wants no renewal of hostilities. We anticipate that Thieu, for his part, will try to persuade the President and Congress that the US still has a commitment to contain communism in Vietnam, and that further aid in that cause is indispensable. The most sensible response from the White House would be scrupulous adherence to articles in the Paris agreement pledging us not to "intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," and not to "impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people."

As preface to the afterthoughts on Vietnam which follow, we would only add that Mr. Nixon has not fully grasped his opportunity to make peace at home. If sanctifying our withdrawals requires reassurances that America has acted with honor, let him say it. But when the President hits obliquely at those, whoever they may be, who "called on us to settle on any terms," and when he equates "courage to stand for the right kind of peace" with uncritical support for all he has done—including last December's bombing of the North—he invites counterattack and further division. Only days after the signing of the accord, the office of the President's director of communications could not resist twisting the tails of "Eastern Establishment" newsmen by compiling for internal White House distribution their published doubts about the outcome of the negotiations—a memo later released to the press by Senator Goldwater as his own.

The time will come when we can reexamine with some detachment and in detail what has been done in Indochina, where blame lies, wherein the agreement reached in January 1973 differed from the agreement of the preceding October, and whether Hanoi was bombed to the peace table, as the White House implies, or whether the December raids were pure acts of terrorism. All this must be explored, for none of these questions can be buried and forgotten. For the moment, however, we look for a leadership that rises above recriminations and self-justifications, that does not presume to forgive its opponents or do them in, that speaks in the spirit of Kissinger: "No one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and no one in these disputes has had a monopoly of moral insight."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ain't Gonna' Cover Wars No More

Evolution of a Dove

As a political cartoonist, I usually have sense enough to avoid getting to know my victims. When it does happen, I am almost invariably charmed (after all, these fellows don't succeed in their line of work by repelling people) and for a long time afterward have to force myself into a proper spirit of objective malevolence when depicting them on paper.

I have the same susceptibility to wars. First-hand exposure to them tends to corrupt me. In World War II I was lucky enough (although I didn't think so at the time) to be involved in the affair deeply for its entirety, from before Pearl Harbor to after VE day, an experience varied enough to keep up my overall perspective.

From then on it was downhill.

In Korea, I spent only a few weeks, most of it with an infantry battalion on a salient which had earned the name "Heartbreak Ridge." Along a path I used every day was a great, frozen puddle of blood which was kept fresh and red by the extreme cold. One of the startling things you learn in wars is how much blood can come from a human body. This particular splash had belonged to a pair of brothers who had been drafted together, were serving in the same squad, and were walking together on an errand when a mortar shell landed between them.

Their blood colored that whole war for me and made it a personal thing—hardly a professional attitude for a journalist. Every time I crawled around the spot on the steep trail to avoid walking through it I got angry again at the North Koreans or Chinese who had fired the round, and at the Russians who had supplied it.

In Vietnam things got even more personal. I started out as a dove on Indochina, back in the early '50s when Vice President Nixon was urging us to send in troops to help the French. I was still a good, sensible dove when JFK and his brother Bobby were hawking it up for Diem. Then I made the mistake of going for a closer look. My first visit was to Pleiku, where one of my sons was an army helicopter pilot.

1962

Personally, I find it a rather unrewarding job.

1964

Without the keystone, the whole works would fall.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I had hardly arrived in early 1965 when the Vietcong, or the North Vietnamese, or both, blew the place apart with rockets, mortars, grenades and satchel charges, killing and wounding dozens of kids in their bunks. At dawn, still wearing only the shorts in which I had been sleeping, my bare feet caked with other peoples' blood, I helped load the last of the casualties on a cargo plane and stood by the airstrip cheering a pair of our fighter-bombers as they thundered by on a low pass, their wings festooned with ordnance, to show us they were on their way to avenge us.

This was the actual beginning of the regular bombing of North Vietnam and there I was hollering my head off in approval. It took most of my other sons a long time to straighten me out after that one.

In my job you get two kinds of mail: angry letters and appreciative plaques. For a while there I was actually getting Americanism awards from Legion posts. Then, as my long-haired offspring slowly prevailed and brought me back to my senses, the plaques dribbled off and the familiar old protests began. Once again I was the tool of the Reds.

In 1967, having correctly guessed the imminence of what turned out to be the Six-Day War, I went to Israel to cover the event and was immediately charmed into partisanship, two weeks before the fighting even began. What turned my head in this case was not violent or gory. I rented a car upon arrival and, wily old war dog that I had become, began packing the trunk with canned goods, jugs of water and gasoline, typewriter ribbon and film. After a while, it struck me that I was the only hoarder in sight. Then the answer came: the reason nobody was making runs on the stores and squirreling stuff away was that the people of this tiny country were calm in the knowledge that when it came the war would be over, one way or another, in a matter of hours or a few days at most. I unloaded—at least to a point where my rear springs no longer sagged, and my respect for the Israelis hasn't diminished to this day.

I have asked my employers to restrain me from covering any more wars—especially any in which the United States might find itself involved. They have agreed, not only in the interest of preserving my journalistic integrity, but because they have determined, over a long period, that the results of my coverage are seldom worth the exorbitant expense accounts I always turn in.

"A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again."

Bill Mauldin

1966

Hey! That's not in the script.

1967

Butchers!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1968



Meat grinder

1970

Troop withdrawal

1971

But he had no right *to be so right!*

1972

Sprout

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Adding Machine Can't Do It

Calculating the Costs

The United States went to the aid of the government of South Vietnam with the best intentions, yet the good intentions have been the most costly the Vietnamese have known. We are told that more than 773,000 North Vietnamese soldiers and more than 124,000 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed from 1965 to 1973. As many as 400,000 South Vietnamese civilians are thought to have been killed; that's statistically equivalent to obliterating every inhabitant of Boston, Washington and New Orleans. Altogether about 2.4 million North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were wounded, many of whom are permanently crippled.

Among other living casualties of the war are the two million refugees who must beg or live on government support in camps. This estimate comes from the Senate subcommittee on refugees, chaired by Edward Kennedy. He believes that more than eight million South Vietnamese have been made refugees since the beginning of the war, many of them victims of a relocation project to create "strategic hamlets" secure from the Vietcong. Quite often these shanty villages are less healthy, no safer than the farm villages they were forced to abandon.

The United States dropped about 7.1 million tons of bombs on Indochina, almost three times the amount dropped in World War II and the Korean war combined. It came to about 284 pounds for every human being in the area. Throughout the war the Pentagon has said that its pilots and gunners aimed only for military targets, and that civilian injuries, when they occurred, were accidental. American bombing in the North knocked out almost every bridge, tore up miles of railroad track, broke the roads and destroyed piers in Haiphong. Factories, schools, hospitals and many dikes along the Red River were hit. Shelling by both sides destroyed villages in the South and completely demolished the towns of Anloc and Quang Tri.

Countless civilians were injured and killed by air weapons, including the North Vietnamese last year who were hit by an American gadget called the "rockeye missile." Delivered in packages of 240, these bomblets were designed to penetrate the ground before they explode, presumably to injure people in shelters. They aren't large enough to damage a building seriously, but they cause shrapnel wounds, amputation and sometimes death by hemorrhaging. Other "anti-personnel" weapons have been scattered over Indochina, including dragonteeth (big enough to blow off a foot, but not a wheel), guava bombs (containers of pellets that bounce diagonally and penetrate shelters) and a plastic bomblet, the shrapnel of which cannot be detected by X-ray. These were not meant to kill, but to cause injuries and burden the enemy with cripples. Wide, uninhabited areas of Vietnam were peppered with such mines as a part of the policy of "remote access denial."

Mechanized warfare in Vietnam has left behind a crop of unexploded weapons in the earth and water. Farming has become dangerous in old battle areas: peasants are wounded as they plow their fields; their cattle become infected when metal fragments cut their hooves. The trees are full of shrapnel. Sawmills are said to close down once a day to repair the damage done to their log cutting blades by pieces of bombs, shells and bullets.

American biologist Arthur Westing estimated in 1971 that US bombing had pocked the Indochinese landscape with about 26 million craters, 21 million in South Vietnam alone. He said the damage will last a decade or more: 10 years after the bombing of Okinawa in World War II the craters were still barren. Craters in Vietnam's delta region—occurring about once every 100 feet—are now permanently filled with water, affording a breeding pool for mosquitoes and malaria. Westing also calculated that between 1962 and 1971 the US sprayed "well over six million acres" of forest with a defoliant chemical meant to make the enemy visible to spy planes. Twenty percent of South Vietnam's forestland was treated. Westing believes that 6.5 billion board feet of lumber was destroyed in this way, and that patches of forest were completely and permanently wiped out. Between 1962 and 1969 the United States also sprayed nine percent of South Vietnam's cropland with poison to deny food to enemy guerrillas. Army bulldozers scraped clear an area equal to the size of Rhode Island. The full impact of the devastation will be slow to materialize, but there has already been a reported increase in malaria, an increase in liver cancer and a decline in the fish population because many breeding grounds have been contaminated.

One statistic that gives an idea of the impact of the war on South Vietnam's culture is the fact that in 1971 American soldiers alone spent $400 million as customers. More than 140,000 Vietnamese then worked for Americans as chauffeurs, laundresses, cooks, prostitutes and office clerks. That number has fallen to about 50,000 and will decline further. Most Vietnamese are unskilled workers, yet because the war was fought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the countryside, many have flocked to the cities looking for jobs. Those who have a skill must compete for the few American-supported jobs that remain; the rest scrape by. The city of Danang, for example, saw its population triple in the seven years after Lyndon Johnson's inauguration, then almost double again during last year's offensive by the North Vietnamese. A country that once exported rice and rubber is now entirely dependent on the United States for its political and economic existence, at a total yearly cost of about $7.8 billion.

Since fiscal year 1965, the budgeted costs of the war have come near $137 billion, a sum that includes a rough estimate of $500 million for the bombing campaign last December. A Cornell study, "The Air War in Indochina," tries to compute the value of potential goods and services lost to our economy in these years, and then estimates the real dollar cost of the war from fiscal 1966 to 1971 to be about $200 billion.

The Defense Department reports that at least 45,928 American lives were lost, excluding the MIA. Wounded number over 300,000, and half of these casualties were serious enough to put men into hospitals. But the department can't calculate the more intangible costs. Here, the most celebrated casualty was the Great Society, shorthand we use to describe domestic social benefits. The choice was made, for many of the poor, not between guns and butter but guns and bread. The Johnson war budget of 1968 left the country with a $23 billion deficit and an economy that was inflating at the rate of six percent a year. With politicians averse to raising taxes to pay for the war, we ended up paying through high unemployment, higher prices and a recession that slammed the Vietnam vets hardest. By last June, the seasonally adjusted rate of unemployment for veterans of the Vietnam era had reached 7.9 percent.

The war will leave its traces in the budget for years. The government has already paid out $4.7 billion in benefits to the veterans, and over the next half-century it will spend at least another $50 billion. Some 23,000 veterans, many of them double amputees, are receiving 100 percent disability compensation for a war no one wanted.

So-called "extraneous" costs don't show up in budgets or cost-of-living indexes. There are no diagrams of the depth and breadth of the rise of contempt for patriotism, for government, for order itself. For draft resisters and deserters, the price of Vietnam was ostracism. With help from Canada's Board of Emigration, Senator Kennedy's office makes a "conservative" estimate of 70,000 young Americans who can't go home. And at home, in 11 years of war abroad, we have jailed 5000 domestic POWs, and there are 15,000 other cases to come under indictment or review.

Consider the "extraneous" costs of heroin, which by 1971 had so ravaged the army that Senator Javits was saying drugs alone would force the US out of Vietnam. The Senate veterans affairs subcommittee reports that 100,000 men may have become addicts. But rather than treat these soldiers, the military's policy was to identify them and eliminate them from the ranks. By October 1971 the army had stigmatized five to six percent of the total task force as "junkies"—a figure based on a urine test erratically applied and easy to cheat on. We could blame heroin on our South Vietnamese ally, whose country we had turned into a graveyard or a shanty of shoe-shine boys and pushers. More shocking were the "fraggings," or murders of American officers and noncoms by their own troops. We shall be paying for it all, painfully, throughout this generation.

Eliot Marshall and Tom Geoghegan

Conclusions from Public Opinion Polls

Comparisons with Korea

Those little numbers paraded in the polling agencies' reports usually have little meaning in themselves. That is, it was not terribly meaningful to declare, for example, that 39 percent of the public did "support" the war in Vietnam because that number could have been appreciably boosted or depressed by a simple change in the wording of the poll question. A comparison of sets of poll statistics is a sounder approach. One can compare groups, assess trends, or juxtapose differently worded questions to see what seemed to influence support for the war.

In the case of Vietnam, a rather special comparison is possible. One can compare support for the war there with support for the war in Korea. The results of such

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an exercise generate a rather extraordinary central finding: for comparable periods the two wars inspired almost exactly the same amount of support and opposition from the American public.

The wars had their similarities of course—both were "dirty little wars" fought in remote places. But the war in Vietnam was accompanied by an enormous, escalating public protest while the Korean war inspired very little vocal opposition. So it seems that the Vietnam protesters, in taking their message to the people, were unable to increase opposition to the war beyond that to be expected from the Korean experience. This suggests a considerable lack of correspondence between what is happening in the public mind and what is happening in the streets and on the nightly news.

On some measures, the similarity of popular support for the two wars was quite precise. The most comprehensive comparison is furnished by responses to the repeated poll question, "Do you think this war has been a mistake?" Support for the wars on this measure dwindled according to the same pattern for both wars: when US casualties grew by a factor of 10—from 1000 to 10,000 or from 10,000 to 100,000, for example—support declined by some 15 percentage points. In absolute terms, the popularity of Vietnam did finally fall below that of Korea, but only after the losses of the later war had considerably exceeded those of the earlier one.

Comparison of the wars using other poll questions is more slippery for many reasons, but the results are similar. The support for withdrawal was about the same, as was the sentiment for escalation; both wars increased yearnings for isolationism to about the same degree.

Furthermore, with one interesting exception, the two wars generated support and opposition in the same quarters of the public—at least as far as can be seen from the usual demographic data available from the polls. Men as compared to women and whites as compared to blacks were relatively hawkish in both instances: they felt the wars not to be a mistake, they spurned withdrawal, they supported escalation.

Contrary to popular belief, the wars were also disproportionately supported by the well educated and for the most part, by the young. Unlike the pure hawks, however, that support was largely cued to the position of the President, not to the issue of the war itself: they supported escalation when the President did, but were willing to turn to deescalation when he led the way.

Because of this group of "followers," support for the bombing of North Vietnam rose some 30 percentage points when President Johnson resumed it after one of his pauses. And bombing support dropped by about the same amount when the bombing halt went into effect in 1968. Public opinion was hardly intractable on the war issue and the opportunities for presidential leadership were enormous.

In addition, the poll data suggest that the motivating factors in popular support for the two wars were much the same. In neither case was there much genuine concern or respect for the local allies, the South Koreans and the South Vietnamese. Nor were civilian casualties, as the response to the My Lai case illustrated, of much interest to the American public. Thus two of the main issues stressed by the antiwar movement—the corruptness of the Saigon regime and the war's destruction of innocent lives—were largely incapable of moving the American people. They already knew about the former and they were not terribly concerned about the latter.

Three aspects of the wars seemed to have impelled support. First, there was the appeal to patriotism: the war was "ours." Far more support was found when the respondent was asked whether "we did the right thing" in getting into the war than when the question blankly asked if "the war has been worthwhile."

The idea of "stopping the Communists" was a second theme that inspired support and a third was a desire to back up "our boys." The impact of these issues can be seen in a comparison of three poll questions posed in May 1971. At that time, 68 percent of the population said they favored a congressional resolution to withdraw from the war by the end of the year. However, only 29 percent were so inclined if withdrawal would mean a Communist takeover in South Vietnam and only 11 percent if it would threaten the lives or safety of US prisoners of war.

Insofar as the antiwar movement allowed itself to be associated with flag-burning, NLF victory rallies and a seeming callousness toward the losses suffered by American troops, it directly confronted these impelling motivations and guaranteed its own ineffectiveness in influencing the public mind.

Since the wars in Korea and Vietnam inspired the same amount of support from the same sources and

Frosting on the Cake

"Little can be gained by believing that North Vietnam would seriously consider giving up all the political and military advantages which it has secured at a heavy price, for the sake of joining some sort of regional TVA. Americans with a nostalgia for Point 4, and Frenchmen who can see a role for France in a reconstituted, neutralist Indochina Federation, share that belief, which may be just as illusory as the 'hawk' idea of treating the Vietnam crisis as 'Cuba II.' An Indochina Common Market, A TVA on the Mekong—well and good, but only as frosting on the cake, after some sort of political-military accommodation has been found. Can one be?"

Bernard B. Fall
The New Republic, January 16, 1965

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the same reasons, then the curiosity to be explained is not so much the existence of a special *popular* opposition to the war in Vietnam as the existence of an unprecedented *vocal* opposition to it.

The opposition, of course, came principally from the intellectual left—the journalistic-academic complex, someone has called it—a group that supported the war in Korea but increasingly opposed the Vietnam venture. This shift is imperfectly reflected in poll data on the attitudes of Jews. They supported the Korean but opposed the Vietnam war and comprise the only subgroup of those usually sorted out in the polls who responded differently to the two wars. (Jewish opposition may also help to explain why the Vietnam protest was so disproportionately centered at the better colleges and universities.)

The intellectual left seems to have found the Korean war an unfortunate but necessary correlate of the policy of containment. The more hard-nosed in this group may have been willing, in 1965, to grant the Johnson administration's position that the dual pressures of China and Indonesia in Southeast Asia called for an analogous application of the policy there. Within a year, however, these pressures were considerably diffused as Indonesia radically shifted policy after an unsuccessful Communist coup attempt and as China entered into its highly diverting Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. With these developments as well as with the increasing costs of the war, the wisdom of the Vietnam venture became less clear and opposition grew.

The protest gained public attention not so much because of its vast popularity among "the people," but because of its effective use of the methods of protest, many of them developed during the early 1960s by the civil rights movement.

None of this is to deny the direct influence of the Vietnam protest and its arguments on many political leaders. But it does not seem that the protesters can be said to have been the vanguard of a special popular resentment to the war. Indeed, it is possible that the war might have been somewhat less popular had the protest not existed. This is because opposition to the war came to be associated with a referent group that was strongly repugnant to the American public. The popular sentiment, it may be recalled, was overwhelmingly on the side of the Chicago police in the disorders at the Democratic Convention in 1968. Intellectual agitation, it appears, is not the same thing as a mass movement.

John Mueller

What Was Won by Protest?

The Peace Movement

Our politics has been marked by a strange logic, a flawed syllogism: the people (a clear majority of them) supported the government; the government carried on the war; but the people did not support the carrying on of the war. At the same time, they did not support the peace movement either, at least not in sufficient numbers. At crucial moments—after the Tet offensive or during the Cambodian invasion, for example—the movement undoubtedly had an impact, but it did not have a decisive impact. The country turned its back on the war, without ever giving those who opposed the war a chance to end it. Nixon finally made the peace and reminded us (and the Vietnamese) with his last savage burst of bombing that he can unmake it too.

But perhaps all this puts the emphasis in the wrong place. When *in our history* have so many citizens challenged so central a government policy? When have so many fled the country, deserted the army, disobeyed the law, organized, demonstrated, agitated—refused to be "good Americans?" When before this have veterans marched against a war in which they had only just stopped fighting? For all the difficulties and tragedies of American politics these past 10 years, there is something enormously heartening in the way a part of the country at least rallied against the Vietnam intervention. *But why didn't the peace movement win?*

For purposes of analysis, the movement can be divided into three parts. First, there were the students. They provided the crucial manpower; their energy, commitment, perhaps above all, their free time, made both mass demonstrations and presidential campaigns politically possible. Their characteristic activities, however, took place on their own campuses. It was there, appropriately, that the educational work of the movement began—with the teach-ins of 1965—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long before ordinary Americans had become experts on Vietnam. But the university was more than an intellectual home. It provided the only political space that opponents of the war could successfully contest, and many of the most dramatic contests necessarily took place there. Given so precise and peculiar a location, it was inevitable that the immediate issues would be local in character, related only indirectly, if at all, to the larger purpose. Student protests focused on university cooperation with the draft, campus recruiting for the armed forces, ROTC, investment policy—and at the same time, black studies, open admissions, community relations and (always) amnesty for the demonstrators. In the '60s it was terribly hard to *concentrate*. But it was always the war that fueled the protest. And it was the growing horror of the war, the daily humiliation of reading the newspaper, and the ineffectiveness of campus action (for whatever student radicals said about university complicity, it was clear that professors and administrators were not determining the nation's policy in Vietnam) which drove some students to an increasingly rancorous, intolerant and violent politics. It is difficult even today to measure the effects of that politics. No doubt it mobilized many worried adults to seek alternative ways of opposing the war, "to bring their children home" before a generation ran amuck. No doubt also it frightened and antagonized others, especially those whose children were not involved, whose children were more likely to be drafted than to go to college. Student politics clearly revealed the class base of the peace movement—which turned out to be one of the most important things about it.

The second part of the movement was the creation of the old left. A whole series of operations were staffed and led by the members of established liberal-left and radical political or religious groups: the National Mobilization, Vietnam Summer (1967), the Moratorium (1969), Clergymen Concerned, Women's Strike for Peace, and so on. Focused more narrowly on the war and, whatever their internal sectarianism (of which the less said the better), tending toward a pragmatic and popular politics, these groups carried the antiwar movement off the campuses and reached out to a larger middle-class constituency. Veterans of the Progressive Party and the popular front, socialists, Trotskyites, members of SANE, ADAers, Quakers, students radical and liberal, moderate and militant, Eastern (and Western) intellectuals: all these they brought together in massive reunions in the streets of Washington, New York and San Francisco. They also organized in their home communities, fought local referendum campaigns, raised money for newspaper ads, signed their names. Theirs was a politics of demonstration. They sought to create and then to express antiwar sentiment, leaving it to conventional politicians to respond to these expressions, to seek the support of the movement, by directly challenging or changing government policy. Politicians did respond, not very bravely, with a few exceptions, but in ways which opened new opportunities for political action. The old left provided a bridge across the chasm that usually separates radical agitation from party politics, and its younger and more moderate followers marched eagerly across.

Some of the leaders (and the student militants in SDS) held back, worried that the purity of the movement and its radical ideology were being compromised. But in fact, groups like the Mobilization were not ideological or particularly radical—even if there were speeches about American imperialism at every rally. Their real task was to generate a mood of hostility to the war or at least of doubt and anxiety about it. That's why it was so important that the crowds be large, look respectable and so on; the speeches hardly mattered. And eventually those multitudes of respectable people had to find a way into the political system.

It was the third part of the peace movement—the presidential campaigns of McCarthy and McGovern—that brought it closest to success. For the American left, conventional politics is itself an achievement. And what was called the "new politics" was entirely conventional: a matter of precinct organization, hard work on city and county committees, endless canvassing and phoning. It seemed new because the people were new and were not defending their interests so much as advancing a cause. They were not pros, though no doubt some of them will become pros. In any case, their first efforts were exhilarating. Here was a chance to fight for radical goals within one of the major parties and *to hope to win*. Unhappily, the movement won only the immediate victory and not the final one. In 1972, building on the achievement of the McCarthy campaign, its partisans seized the Democratic Party. But that extraordinary victory split the party and revealed the precise limits of movement strength.

How much support did the movement have? From the local referenda of 1967 (in San Francisco, Madison, Cambridge) to the McGovern campaign of 1972, and in the opinion polls throughout those years, the figure hovered just under 40 percent. There seemed to be a barrier fixed to its growth, even while the activities of the movement expanded enormously in scope and antiwar agitation was moved from the margins to the very center of our national life. And that barrier had a recognizable social and political character: the movement was unable to penetrate significantly into the ranks of organized labor and of those working-class ethnic groups which have traditionally been the strength of the Democratic Party. There are so many reasons for this that it is probably right to say that the failure was overdetermined. But it needs to be talked about anyway.

The most immediate reason is also the most obvious. The Democratic politicians most highly regarded by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American workers were themselves implicated in the Vietnam war and unable or unwilling to break away from it. For years this was a Democratic war, and a whole generation of liberal leaders (whose domestic achievements had earned them that title) were discredited and destroyed by it. Trapped by their past commitments or still believing in the Cold War ideology they had so long espoused, they did not repudiate the horrors of Vietnam even after Nixon had made those horrors his own. They hoped desperately that the fighting would end before 1972; they twisted and turned to get off the hook; they never made a moral decision against the war (although they stopped defending it), and they turned out to have made the worst of all possible political choices. Had they behaved differently, a unified Democratic Party would certainly have triumphed in 1972. Instead, they pushed their constituents toward Richard Nixon.

But their constituents probably did not have to be pushed very hard, for the peace movement antagonized many Americans whose support it could not do without. Partly this was because of what movement partisans did: the continual provocations of self-righteousness and zeal, the senseless challenges to working-class patriotism, the deliberate linking of antiwar and countercultural politics. Opposition to the President on foreign policy traditionally draws on a very limited constituency, an elite of the concerned, inevitably self-chosen, largely from the upper and middle classes. The peace movement was the product of a class society. Students and intellectuals, suburban women, amateurs with time and money to spend: it was not only their creed that was offensive to American workers but their persons. Behind George Meany's pique there was a powerful class hostility, which he and others were able to exploit. Important labor leaders and many thousands of workers supported the peace movement, especially in the unions with a strong leftist heritage (like the UAW), but they never made it their own. Its tone was always middle class, academic, suburban. Only in the army itself and among veterans, exiles and deserters did the movement seem classless. But there it was also very small.

The crucial battle was fought for the hearts and minds of American liberals. Its long-term result is still unclear. It may give rise eventually to a politics more humane and more *worried* than the complacent and technological liberalism of a decade ago. Immediately, however, the divisions in the liberal world made it certain that the war would go on, and the ongoing war further deepened the divisions. Nixon was the sole beneficiary of this process. Many people said that he had to end the war in order to win reelection. But in fact it was his refusal to end the war for four long years that guaranteed his electoral triumph.

Except for the reformed Democratic Party, the peace movement has left behind no institutional residue. Those of its activists who thought they were building a political base for the future will probably be proved wrong. The "new politics" will survive, but only within the Democratic Party and as a part of one or another future coalition. What has now been demonstrated is that it cannot win by itself and that it cannot grow by simple expansion. But that is only a practical lesson. The real effects of the struggle against the Vietnam war are moral. Those effects are what is usually being referred to when people talk of a crisis of authority in this country. That means: the American government is today less believable and less "obeyable" than it has ever been. That is the price its leaders have paid for their war. We have to be glad of that, for what sort of a country would America be if they had had to pay no price at all, if their lies had been believed and their crimes justified by *all* the American people? In this sense, the peace movement was a partial success. It made the waging of the war morally costly; it reestablished the importance of moral and legal discourse about military conduct and political authority; it created a larger constituency of conscientious men and women than the country had seen before (and made some of them into experienced politicians); it began, perhaps, the long process of setting limits to what governments can do and to what men must bear.

Michael Walzer

Escalation

"The whole gradual involvement in Vietnam can be explained largely in terms of counterinsurgency, insurgency: counterinsurgency, then more insurgency; then more counterinsurgency . . . a kind of leap frog. As this has taken place, as we have escalated the counterinsurgency, we have also had to escalate the explanation for it: Going from simply helping out South Vietnam, which they said was strong and needed just a little bit of help, to nation building, and then beyond that, when our military commitment reached 200,000 men (which is really too many for nation building in South Vietnam), to the larger explanation that we were saving all of Southeastern Asia and then, as we got near 500,000 (which seemed even too much for that kind of purpose), a broader statement that the security of the United States itself was involved. And when that did not seem quite reasonable in terms of the Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese (a rather small and poor nation not very technically advanced), the Secretary of State suggested that really what we were doing is anticipating the year 2000 at which time, as he said, there would be one billion Chinese."

Senator Eugene McCarthy
Corvallis, Oregon, May 21, 1968

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It Had the Power and Didn't Use It

Role of the Congress

The performance of Congress suggests a chastening lesson. Even if it is reformed, the Congress will always play second fiddle to the Executive on foreign affairs—especially when it is unwilling to use the foreign policy powers it already has.

It is tempting to go back to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 and say that was the beginning of . . . that if Congress had only known the connection between US destroyers in the gulf and the South Vietnamese naval attacks against North Vietnam . . . if it had only known the flimsiness of the reports about the second attack . . . if it had only known that the blank check it was signing might so soon be cashed, the resolution never would have passed and the Vietnam war might never have been.

But too much is made of Tonkin. It was a symptomatic, not a seminal event. From the moment of the Geneva Conference of 1954, Senate liberals had been beating the drums to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam. Senator Lyndon Johnson called the accords a "stunning reversal," leaving the United States "in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world." Senator Mike Mansfield in effect called the accords a humiliation, and along with senators such as Hubert Humphrey and Paul Douglas, he began insisting that Diem be saved in order that South Vietnam be saved. They were soon joined by Republican leaders—Bridges, Wherry and Knowland. Knowland made a stirring speech in the summer of 1956, calling on his President to support Diem in order to avoid a "continental Dienbienphu."

Then, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, liberals in Congress became concerned about Diem's misuse of American aid, about corruption, even about Diem himself once the repression of the Buddhists was known and once it began to appear that Diem could not build the political stability in the South necessary to defeat the Vietcong. But the underlying assumption was that Vietnam was vital to the national security of the United States. The cry was for "reform," and who could be against that? Less than a handful of legislative leaders were questioning the basic commitment. In the fall of 1963, Senator George McGovern said: "The US position in Vietnam has deteriorated so drastically that it is in our national interest to withdraw from that country our forces and our aid." But when it came time to vote on the Tonkin Resolution, he thought the Congress should unite behind the President. Only Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening were on the "nay" side of the ledger that day.

In retrospect, from Dienbienphu to Tonkin, the public record that on the whole looks best is that of the conservative Democrats. In early 1954, Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado said on the Senate floor that "The present crusade to send troops to Indochina, with its uncalculated cost and uncalculated result, is the most foolhardy adventure in all American history . . . to drift, drift, drift, closer and ever closer to the flaming candle, like some silly enchanted moth, is almost too fantastic for human minds to contemplate." After the Geneva accords, Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana argued that by all indications, Indochina would go Communist and that US aid was therefore a "waste." Senators John Stennis and Richard Russell publicly and privately voiced disapproval of the course of American policy in Vietnam and Laos and that whole part of the world. But like Senator Mansfield, who came to share their doubts, they did not fight hard for their beliefs.

After 1965, the conservatives fell in behind the flag and called for military victory; center Democrats and Republicans were to say forlornly that the United States had to stick it out; and a small but growing band of liberals, mostly from the ranks of former war supporters, began to urge deescalation and negotiation. The new lines were established in the summer of 1965. On June 15, Fulbright said that "a complete military victory in Vietnam . . . can in fact be attained only at a cost far exceeding the requirements of our interests and our honor," but "that the unconditional withdrawal of American support . . . would have disastrous consequences." Fulbright recommended a policy of "determination to end the war at the earliest possible time by a negotiated settlement involving major concessions on both sides." Days later, Russell rose to say that the war was a mistake, but "whether or not there was an initial mistake is now moot. The United States does have a commitment in South Vietnam. The flag is there. United States honor and prestige are there. And, most important of all, United States soldiers are there."

The following years brought proposals to bomb North Vietnam back into the stone age, to negotiate, to have a cease-fire, to send more troops, to send less troops, for free elections, for coalition government, for the United Nations to take over the job, for anything and everything, everything, that is, except abandonment of the basic commitment to prevent a Communist victory by force in South Vietnam.

Through the remainder of the Johnson presidency,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the death toll mounted and the cost rose, the President seemed to have inexhaustible devices for keeping the Congress in line. If Goldwater and others demanded escalation, Johnson would get on TV and warn of the dangers of confrontation with Russia and China and of nuclear war. If conservatives got publicity for their calls for more troops, Westmoreland would be paraded on Capitol Hill to assure that all was well. If the cries from the left to stop the bombing were peaking, Johnson would order a bombing halt—without changing the terms of negotiations. If the liberals shouted about the unrepresentativeness of the government in Saigon, he would dredge up another election and send a delegation of legislators to South Vietnam as observers. Only after the Tet offensive of February 1968 did those techniques diminish in their effectiveness. There was a limit to the number of times even Lyndon Johnson could go to the well and come up with water.

But it was always the President who controlled the terms of debate, and most legislators seemed all too willing to be dominated. If they criticized too sharply or urged some policy change, they would be taking on added responsibility for whatever would happen. Better to leave that responsibility with the President; if anything went wrong, it would be his fault, not theirs. Most legislators could and did have it both ways. They criticized the President on one issue or another and still supported the war. They called for negotiations, but without supporting a lowering of American goals so that compromise would become possible. They demanded that the South Vietnamese army do more of the fighting, and simultaneously voted funds to send additional American troops to battle. They said the United States should not have gotten involved in the first place, but that we could not "bug out." They praised peace and approved appropriations for the war. They had the means to stand up to the President, but were afraid to use them. We were at war, the President was commander-in-chief. Making speeches attacking the President and his policy was one thing; using the power of the purse, the appropriations process to cut off funds for the war was quite another. The Congress was unable to shape policy by rhetoric, and it was unwilling to impose policy through legislation.

Throughout these peak years of American involvement, the President had another trump card: he was the leader of the political party that controlled the Congress. The election of a Republican President in 1968, as much as the agony of the Vietnam experience, may have finally turned many liberals away from the vision of congressional-executive relations that they held in the late 1950s and early 1960s. One has to contemplate the possibility that the election of Hubert Humphrey might have reaffirmed liberal faith in a strong presidency and a complacent Congress. But Nixon, after all, was not *their* leader. So academic allies of liberal politicians no longer concentrated their studies on what makes a "good" President strong; the new liberal concern was how to help the Congress keep a "bad" President in check.

Yet after four years of guerrilla conflict between a conservative Republican President and his liberal Democratic opponents in the Congress, it should be apparent that the earlier liberal view of executive-congressional relations had much truth to it. Congress will always be in the shadow of the Executive on foreign policy issues. After 1969, Congress emerged slightly from this shadow on Vietnam, but it never became a real participant in the making of war or peace. The traps of the '60s are still operating.

Congress did, in November 1971, formally express itself, declaring it to be US policy to terminate at the earliest practicable date all our military actions by a date certain, subject to the release of Americans held captive and an accounting for those missing in action. And it urged the President to implement this policy by negotiating a cease-fire and the phased withdrawal of US forces in return for the prisoners. This was a step away from the old pattern of congressional demands for the inconsistent best of all possible worlds. But it had no real effect. The President was able to ignore it or claim that he was carrying out that policy anyway. And the Congress remained unwilling to use the powers of the purse and its warmaking powers to translate intentions into action.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was terminated by the 91st Congress in January 1971. By then President Nixon claimed legal authority to carry on the war through his powers as commander-in-chief. He did not bother to oppose burial of the resolution. Thus, an interesting conclusion about the resolution could be drawn: it provided a legal basis for the war when the Executive said it did, and yet its withdrawal did not destroy that basis—when the Executive said it did not. Nor did a majority of Congress seem to dispute the Executive's switch in interpretation.

Using its powers of appropriation, the Congress has, since 1969, placed certain limits on US actions with regard to Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. But on the central issue—US troops and bombing in Vietnam—the liberals failed to carry Congress with them. Again, the reason lay in the President's ability to control the political terms of debate. He and his spokesmen argued that measures limiting the bombing or forcing troop withdrawals by budgetary cuts were unnecessary and dangerous—unnecessary because these were the trends and goals of his policies in any case; dangerous because such measures might affect the safety of the American troops still in Vietnam. As the 1972 elections drew nearer, the pressure to avoid the appearance of endangering our troops grew stronger. As a result, only the most determinedly antiwar senators and representatives pressed for measures that went beyond limiting US involvement in Laos, Cambodia and Thai-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

land, where American ground units were not in combat. A fund cutoff for operations in Vietnam might have seemed irresponsible to the voters, especially if the commander-in-chief told them it was irresponsible.

All of this suggests that we should pay more attention to political relationships between the President and the Congress—"political" not in a partisan sense, but in its broader meaning. Liberal reformers are now placing much of their faith in structural reform through a war powers bill. That does not get at the President's powers to shape the terms of debate. In allowing him to commit US troops for 30 days of combat before the Congress acts, it gives him the whip hand. What congressman will vote for "surrender"—as defined by the President—once our soldiers have been fighting in some foreign land for a month?

Congress *can* play a more decisive role in shaping the terms of debate by getting more information and by having the will to use this information publicly to "make trouble" for the administration. Information is power. Congress can legislate for itself more access to intelligence reports and to policy planning papers. It can force the administration to explain itself publicly. It can try, for example, to dislodge the President's key advisers from behind the shield of secrecy, from current abuses of the principle of executive privilege. So long as the President's national security adviser behaves like his secretary of State, he should be made as accountable to the Congress as a secretary of State. And the Congress should not abide a refusal by the President to let any administration witness describe, though it be in closed session, the purposes and prospects of his policies—as the President did refuse to in the immediate aftermath of his ordering the B-52 bombings of Hanoi in December.

In seeking to right the constitutional balance between the Congress and the Executive, we should recognize that the odds are against the Congress' reforming itself so that it becomes a more nearly equal partner with the President on major policy questions.

Redressing the constitutional balance will depend as much or more on the presidency's willingness to alter its behavior as on the ability of the Congress to force a change. Most importantly, we can conclude from the Vietnam experience that more information and clearer definitions of its powers will not mean much unless the Congress is willing to act upon them. This would require a decision by the legislative leaders to accept the same accountability for foreign policy decisions that recent Presidents have been willing—even anxious—to assume. If the Congress wants to lay claim to additional power, it must accept additional responsibility. For its failure on Vietnam was not, finally, proof of powerlessness. Congress had more power than it used. The failure was its flight from responsibility.

Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake

Historical Roots

How the American War Began

Few conflicts in history have produced a disparity as great as that between the original purpose of US intervention in Indochina and the ultimate result of that intervention.

Let us begin with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Before 1940 Roosevelt, like most Americans, felt no concern for the people held under tight colonial control by the French in Indochina. His vaunted anti-colonialism was the result of the need to stop Japan; it was not a product of conscience or principle. When the Vichy French regime allowed Japanese military power to flow uncontested into Indochina, Roosevelt became an anti-colonialist because the inability of a colonial regime to defend itself constituted a threat to American security. Roosevelt spoke many times during the war of his determination to see that the French never returned, but as the war and his own life came to an end, the President's convictions lost what little force they had ever had.

Indochina was very, very far down on the list of problems facing President Harry S Truman in 1945-46. The French returned to Indochina with British support and American acquiescence. The thin hope that the French and Ho Chi Minh might work out and abide by a peaceful accord was finally shattered by the French bombardment of Haiphong in November 1946. For the next three years the American government showed no enthusiasm for the French cause, but even less for the Viet Minh. No one in Washington was under any illusions that the endlessly qualified French promises

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of self-government "within the French Union" for Indochina could be taken seriously or that Emperor Bao Dai, installed by the French, was strong enough even to be a respectable puppet. The overriding objective in Washington in those postwar years was to encourage the restoration of European political and economic vitality. There seemed to be no purpose in criticizing the French in Indochina when the United States wanted them to respond positively to our aid in Europe.

The end of the passive American attitude toward the French colonial war came in late 1949 and early 1950. The Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in August 1949 convinced the American government that a much greater mass of military power would have to be assembled in order to deter war, or to provide a chance for victory if war came. In the United States this meant beginning to work on the hydrogen bomb and readying requests to Congress for a much larger defense budget. In Europe it meant lifting the restrictions on West German heavy industry and persuading NATO allies to increase their armed forces.

At this point the connection between the main policy of building power against Russia in Europe and the French colonial war in Indochina confronted Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The French argued that the drain of Indochina prevented them from doing more in Europe and that, furthermore, in their weakened state they could not tolerate unlimited German power. Some currency had to be discovered with which to buy French acceptance for rapid German economic revival and greater direct French contributions to military power in Europe. The obvious answer was American military aid to the French in Indochina. Secretary Acheson tried briefly to condition that aid on French willingness to grant real self-government in Indochina, but he quickly gave up the effort. It would be a very hard thing, the French ambassador told him on one occasion, to get a French soldier to fight and die for Vietnamese independence.

On May 8, 1950—exactly five years after VE day—the United States formally announced the extension of military aid to the French for Indochina. There are many candidates for the precise date the United States went to war in Indochina. May 8, 1950 is the best. An aid mission was sent immediately to Saigon. The hardware was close behind. On the same day French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman learned of the American decision, he told Acheson of the "Schuman Plan," whereby the limits on West German coal and steel production would be eliminated. This was no coincidence.

In public, the American government could not explain its decision as part of a Europe-centered deal. Instead the American people were told that the United States was helping the French and the people of Indochina maintain their independence against Communist aggression. But as so often happens, the authors of propaganda became its first and most completely persuaded victims. The Korean war in this instance helped the process along. By the summer of 1950 it was no longer possible to distinguish the rhetoric in the secret American papers on Vietnam from the Department of State press releases.

Americans and French alike described Korea and Indochina as separate battles in the same global war against a single enemy. George F. Kennan was one of the few Americans within the government to challenge this mindless assertion. He saw the conflict in Indochina as a struggle for national independence and warned that neither the French nor the Americans alone nor the two together could prevail. But in the summer of 1950 Kennan's views were not highly valued in the State Department. He soon went on leave to write books.

By 1952 the United States was supplying nearly all the military equipment for the French war, but the Viet Minh were stronger than ever. There were increasing signs that the French government might entertain the possibility of a graceful withdrawal. Such an outcome ought to have been encouraged by the United States as consistent with its original aim of seeking maximum French power concentrated in Europe. But by now the original motive had nearly disappeared from American thinking, to be replaced by nightmare visions of Communist China, the tool of Moscow, thwarted in Korea, turning next to the conquest of Indochina. And from there, where?

The French were now the problem from the point of view of the Americans directing the flow of arms to Indochina. If only the French would abandon their arrogant colonial ways (back to FDR!) and start training Vietnamese officers or—better yet—allow Americans (free of the black taint of colonialism) to take over the training, then the war would soon be won.

The men who were responsible for the first American commitment to the Indochina war left office in January 1953 with the end of the Truman administration. The French military position continued to deteriorate until the final collapse at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. President Eisenhower's decision, against the advice of Admiral Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not to send American combat forces to save the French stands out as one of the few sane moments in a quarter-century of folly. Not surprisingly the Trumanites, watching from the sidelines, condemned Eisenhower for not using military forces at a decisive juncture.

By 1961 the Trumanites and their disciples were back in power in Washington. They saw a faction-ridden, corrupt government in Saigon and blamed the situation on the lack of vigor and imagination in the Eisenhower administration, just as earlier they had blamed the French when American military aid did not bring victory. The rest is familiar. Men in power

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

did not ask what the United States would achieve by "success." They devoted themselves to searching for scapegoats to explain failure: after the French and after Eisenhower, Ngo Dinh Diem, outmoded American tactics (bring on the Green Berets), neoisolationism, Dr. Spock, selfish allies, Senator Fulbright, too many restrictions on our bombers, etc., etc.

Those who came on board to help manage the war never realized how limited the original motive had been. Instead they conjured clouds of towering purpose: to defend a people's right to govern themselves in peace and freedom, to defeat aggression, to prevent World War III, to sustain American greatness.

The initial commitment was announced in Paris in 1950 as a means of strengthening American policy in Europe. Ironically, the cease-fire agreements were negotiated in the same city almost a quarter-century later by a man—Henry Kissinger—who could well appreciate how much damage the war had done to American relations with Europe.

Gaddis Smith

From the Perspective of Morality

Rights and Wrongs

Since we Americans were from the start a morally divided people, we tried to evade our divisions by finding pragmatic projects on which we could agree. We could leave private world views, justifications and moral disagreements to private anguish. All the more so because the nation has carried within it so many implicit moral ideals: the right to revolution, self-determination, justice, freedom, equality. Here's where trouble starts. To insist on full implementation of these ideals in the wide world is naive; not to do so seems hypocritical. Our moral inheritance is sometimes hawk, sometimes dove, always albatross.

One fruit of the Vietnam experience is reemergence of the word "moral" in the discussions of foreign policy. Nevertheless, many of us are dissatisfied with the moral framework of that discussion as provided by three administrations, by the "realists," and by critics like Senator McGovern, but also Chomsky, Spock, the Berrigans, who made the war's immorality their point of attack.

To take the last group first. There is too much truth to the charge that moralistic analysis got us into the war to be comfortable with the thought that moralistic analysis could (or did!) lead us out. The country has been badly scarred by self-righteousness. It is true that the extraordinary demonstrations of the peace movement filled a gap left by the weakness of local and national political leadership, vis-a-vis the White House; it is sometimes appropriate to give "witness"; righteous indignation is sometimes politically potent. But witness, too, is a political act and must be judged according to all its political consequences. Its class interests must be analyzed. And I think it is fair to say that peace protests often became forms of class warfare. The cause of peace was lost in the larger, vaguer cause of "cultural revolution." The result was that many who were opposed to the war were even *more* opposed to war protesters. In brief, good intentions are not enough. We must calculate political *effects*.

The moral perspective supplied by the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations was likewise deficient, for other reasons. The following conditions would have had to be met for their policies to have had a fully moral form:

1) Clear reasons given for *why* we went into Vietnam. Against whom? For the Vietnamese? Against the Chinese? Under what imperatives, in which order of importance?

2) Knowledge about the Vietnamese people and their politics publicly supplied. To this day, few know the work of a single Vietnamese philosopher or poet, or even folksinger. The level of our knowledge of Vietnamese culture, religions and history was abysmal. How could we know our intervention was a last resort?

3) Objectives, timetables and cost outlines; with mechanisms for review and withdrawal.

4) Means and methods proportional both to the objectives and to our moral image of ourselves.

If the struggle in Vietnam was civil and political, then the high level of technological destruction and disruption was disproportionate—and horrible not because war is horrible but because *this kind* of war in *these circumstances* is horrible. Moreover, if the American people did not have the heart to expend American lives in the numbers a less technological war would have required, that was strong *prima facie* evidence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the war was unworthy. To wage technological warfare of such ferocity was in that case morally cheap; not to face its brutality and terror in full public consciousness was hypocritical. (On such grounds I formed my own judgment that the war was "immoral" —although the word seems to me strongest when used sparingly.)

It will be noted that these four conditions, supported by a common sense instinct for ways in which a moral claim is appropriately challenged, are fairly accurate translations of ancient "just war" theory. Speaking to a Washington rally of Clergy and Laity Concerned in January 1967, Eugene McCarthy found the US policy in Vietnam lacking in all four classical respects and thus announced his public opposition. I recall the weightiness of his every sentence.

Concerning the "realists," three points of dissatisfaction linger. First, we deserved a more careful study of the values important to the American people as part of their self-understanding—and, therefore, as part of the "national interest" they would uphold. Many Americans, for example, found it intolerable for a great armed power to bludgeon a tiny, poor nation into submission in a highly ambiguous, largely civil struggle. That is because of moral values and imperatives historically nurtured among us. It is in our interest to identify and to nourish these values and imperatives. One sobering lesson of Vietnam is that America's moral resources are not so vast as either our moralists or our realists have taken for granted; and yet that they are real.

Secondly, the "realist" position too speedily dodged significant questions. Here, for example, is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: "Moral values in international politics —or so, at least my temperament enjoins me to believe —should be decisive only in questions of last resort. One must add that questions of last resort do exist." But what of McKinley's temperament? or Nixon's? or Eisenhower's? or Mussolini's? The imperative of an examined life forbids us to hide behind "temperament." Perhaps there are tendencies in my temperament I ought to counter. So we expected an *argument* for Schlesinger's position, not a declaration from his guts. And similarly from a government. We should not countenance bland statements that policy X is "the American way" or "the American duty." We want to know why. Moral reasoning must be made more explicit than realists-by-temperament like to make it.

Thirdly, in stressing the importance of a sense of "ambiguity," the "realists" were thinking of one horn of the American schizophrenia—our self-righteousness; and they neglected the other—the crass pragmatism of the hucksters and the corporation men. The need of an optimistic, practical people is to justify the gap between ideals and practicalities. "Ambiguity" became a defense mechanism for holding onto ideals and ugly realities at the same time—aides in South Vietnam explaining that the gap between hamlet evaluation systems and reality must be accepted with tough-mindedness: But the category of moral ambiguity is not properly applied to the gap between ideals and facts, nor to the gap between means and ends. It applies 1) to the abiding gap between one's self-image and one's actual deeds, and 2) to the gap between one's best judgment of what is right and final historical judgment.

America's national schizophrenia has arisen from thinking much too highly of ourselves. Our false self-image, in turn, is based on inexperience. We have not truly known defeat. Hurrying to ever new frontiers, we have never paused to face our capacity for evil and brutality. The experience of Vietnam is the first time we have been caught. And of course President Nixon is trying to wriggle away, maintaining the bluff of honor. If the experience of Vietnam helps to mature us, our moral statements henceforth may be more modest, more accurate, more steady; our conduct more subdued and humane. The first meaning of ambiguity is that we are not as good as we think we are.

The second meaning of ambiguity is that we do not and cannot know the long-range consequences of our acts. "The Almighty," Lincoln said, "has His own purposes." Human action is frequently tragic because good persons with good intentions destroy by their actions what they thought to build.

President Nixon, for instance, will believe that his toughness of response—the summer mining of Haiphong, the Christmas bombing of Hanoi—induced negotiations when all else failed, and maintained important fictions about American resolve, loyalty to friends, and perseverance in commitments. He may believe that in the face of enormous counterpressures, his own course was morally heroic and politically masterful. He may be sensitive to every refugee and every broken body and—God knows how—have believed his use of raw power necessary. The terrible irony of moral discourse on such large matters, whose long-range consequences escape us all, is that in the light of future history *he* may turn out to have been correct, and those who opposed him wrong. I do not see how this can be. But stranger vindications have occurred.

Lincoln noted in his second inaugural that when both sides pray to God for victory, both prayers cannot be answered. When opposing camps each devoutly believe in their own course, for all its limitations, both cannot be correct.

The test of our honesty at this point is how accurately we hear the *strongest* argument of our opposition, and reply carefully to it. Our political enemies thus help inform our moral conscience. In their error, Niebuhr used to say, there is some truth; in our truth, some error.

Michael Novak

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Putting Indochina Together Again

Uncertainties of Reconstruction

In an accord containing more than 10,000 words, including the protocols, Indochina's future rehabilitation and recovery is dealt with in 57 words: "The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina." Presumably the formulation of those innocuous phrases occupied Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho for only a little time, at least as compared with the more immediate problems of instituting a cease-fire, extricating US forces, exchanging prisoners and beginning substantive political discussions between Saigon and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Ambiguity in diplomatic documents, as Mr. Kissinger is fond of reminding us, often masks fundamental disagreements. In this case, external evidence leads to the conclusion that Washington and Hanoi entertain quite different conceptions of postwar development and foreign assistance.

Recent statements and leaks from administration officials, for example, point to continuing confidence that offers of large-scale aid are a tantalizing "carrot" for the Vietnamese, complementing the "stick" that will be retained in Thailand and the South China Sea in the form of combat-ready aircraft. In short, if the Vietnamese salivate, as we have been trying to get them to do for almost a decade, they will find us grandly beneficent along lines of "traditional policy," presumably a reference to the Marshall Plan. One is reminded here of Lyndon Johnson's multibillion-dollar offers of earlier years, and his sad comment to Bill Moyers after Ho Chi Minh turned him down repeatedly: "I don't understand it. George Meany would've grabbed at a deal like that."

On the other hand, for North Vietnam and the PRG, American involvement in postwar reconstruction is synonymous with reparations. The moral question of blame for all the damage and death caused by US aircraft, ships and artillery is irrevocably linked in their minds with clear notions of who should help put things back together again. As Le Duc Tho stated in his January 24th press conference, "The United States cannot avoid responsibility for contributing to the healing of the war wounds after so many years of war."

With such contrary perceptions, is there any chance whatsoever of eventually translating those 57 words into a workable program of rehabilitation? Yes, according to a number of specialists who have carefully followed the situation. But it will mean negotiating a bewildering network of funding and implementing arrangements, some bilateral and others international. The International Guarantee Conference provided for in Article 19 of the Paris agreement and now scheduled to open February 26, may provide the best opportunity to discuss and organize various preliminary operations.

Much of the public attention is likely to focus on any negotiations between North Vietnam and the US concerning the fabled $2.5 billion that President Nixon offered them last year. There is, after all, a certain morbid fascination in watching your government shift from terror bombing with B-52s in December to trying several months later to "show Hanoi how to grow better rice and how to let its people learn to read and get happy" (another LBJ statement).

However the really thorny situation is in South Vietnam, where two governments compete fiercely for influence and ultimate control, and where there is a very high degree of socioeconomic and psychic dislocation produced by the war. In all likelihood the Nixon administration will soon unveil a large "new" AID program for the Thieu regime and try to sell it to Congress and the public as postwar reconstruction. It will be nothing of the sort, since the main program objectives, as in the past, will be US welfare financing for a government incapable of raising more than 10 percent of its own taxes. It will amount to little more than continued bankrolling of the bloated ARVN armed forces and sustaining Saigon's huge security apparatus—the web of police repression, prisons and population control.

Senator Edward Kennedy, chairman of the Judiciary subcommittee on refugees, seemed to anticipate this eventuality when, on January 18, he released a series of pointed questions that he had submitted to Secretary of State Rogers a week earlier. Among other things, he asked if the US would consider *both* Saigon and the PRG to be "responsible and eligible for administering post-war assistance?" The Paris agreement, signed after his questions were formulated, would appear to make each South Vietnamese government equally eligible.

Senator Kennedy is particularly concerned about the millions of refugees. Now that the persistent bombing and shelling of their ancestral villages has stopped —if not the small-arms shooting—many of them will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

want to leave the refugee camps and urban slums, to go home and start preparing the fields for a first rice crop. However, President Thieu has ordered his police to arrest or shoot anyone "inciting" refugees to leave Saigon-controlled zones. If USAID helps Thieu do it, he may even try to imitate the East Germans and build hundreds of miles of barbed-wire fences, complete with anti-personnel mines, watch towers, searchlights and guard dogs. And if this proves inadequate, Thieu seems to have no reluctance about using American-supplied aircraft and artillery against the villages again, using the William Westmoreland precedent of "forced urbanization."

But for one optimistic moment, at least, let's assume that the cease-fire eventually does stick, that refugees are permitted freedom of movement as provided in the Paris agreement, and that both sides start demobilizing their troops. What are the most pressing rehabilitation problems in South Vietnam and what can the US do to help?

First of all, millions of people returning to the countryside to till the land, including many of the demobilized soldiers, will be faced with cratered fields, salted with unexploded mines, bombs and artillery shells. They will look for water buffalo to plow and cultivate the land, but few buffalo will have survived the war. Seeds, fertilizer, farm implements will be scarce, and there will be local disputes over property ownership. Dikes and dikelets will have to be patched up, houses rebuilt and wells cleaned out. Many canals will require extensive dredging and repair—both to bring in irrigation water and to keep sea water from intruding.

In the cities and towns there will be a need to keep basic services operating (public utilities, marketing, transportation, communications), and to try to revive services that have collapsed (sanitation, medicine, education). Tens of thousands of soldiers will return to the cities, but there will be no jobs. Inflation will be more of a threat than ever before, and there may be critical scarcities of food, gasoline and cooking oils.

In such a situation perhaps the most important thing the US can do for a year or so is provide rice imports to both of the Vietnamese governments, so that the first two growing seasons at least can be spent restoring the land. Second only to rice will be the need for gasoline and diesel oil, not to fuel all the Hondas that choke Saigon, but to convert as many military vehicles as possible into makeshift tractors, dirt movers, buses and produce carriers. Third, there must be a way to provide thousands of livestock to begin to make up the terrible deficit caused by wartime attrition. Finally, there may be a need to take large-scale preventive measures against epidemics (plague, cholera, typhoid) and endemic diseases (malaria, tuberculosis) that could sap the physical capabilities and morale of an entire people trying to bring their country back to life.

None of this says anything about the long-term basic questions of postwar development. And, indeed, nothing should be said by Americans. How is it possible for rational planning to proceed, and allocations to be made, without knowing yet what kind of economic, social and political systems the people of South Vietnam are going to set for themselves? Will they opt for capitalism, socialism or some mixed economic system? Will they allow foreign private investment to any significant degree, or prefer to relate to the outside mostly on a government-to-government basis? Will economic relations between North and South Vietnam be reestablished within several years? Will great emphasis be placed on redistribution of wealth, or will the present gross inequalities continue to exist?

If South Vietnam poses these uncertainties, what of Laos and Cambodia? Damage in both countries has been considerable; refugees are everywhere. Despite Henry Kissinger's intimations, the bombing, shelling and killing has not by last week given way to negotiated cease-fires in either country. But this may not prevent the administration from approaching Congress with new security assistance programs for US clients, masquerading as reconstruction. The Japanese government also has shown a special interest in further "developmental" support to Vientiane and Phnom Penh.

Where does this leave us? With a sense, first of all, that postwar reconstruction will remain a creature of diplomatic policy until the armistice can somehow be transformed into peace. Second, that short-term relief is where Congress and private agencies can set forth, if they want to, a humanitarian program of assistance divorced from AID and continuing US security support for the Thieu regime.

David G. Marr

Contributors

BILL MAULDIN, *whose* Sort of a Saga *has just been reissued by Norton, is a two-time Pulitzer Prize cartoonist;* JOHN MUELLER, *professor of political science at the University of Rochester, is the author of* War, Presidents and Public Opinion; MICHAEL WALZER *is professor of government at Harvard;* GADDIS SMITH, *master of Pierson College at Yale, teaches history;* LESLIE H. GELB *is visiting professor at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution;* ANTHONY LAKE *is working on studies of foreign policy for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Council on Foreign Relations;* MICHAEL NOVAK's The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics *was recently published by Macmillan;* DAVID G. MARR, *one-time captain in the marines, is director of the Indochina Resource Center in Washington, DC.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Kauffmann on films

The Flavor of Green Tea over Rice
(New Yorker)

The Getaway
(National General)

Up the Sandbox
(National General)

If you know Yasujiro Ozu at all, you know that the first title above is his. New Yorker Films continue their American unveiling of this master's work, and our thanks continue, too, even though this one is clearly lesser Ozu. All his films seem to have been made entirely *within* him, then transferred to film stock. Zen Buddhism did for Ozu what Roman Catholicism did for the best of Robert Bresson: provided composure and immediacy and a refined scale in which a small gesture implicates the cosmos.

Green Tea was made in 1952, 11 years before Ozu died. It was a story he had wanted to make in 1941, had been forced to abandon, and then revised with his usual collaborator, Kogo Noda. There are two main strands. A socially pretentious Tokyo wife, scornful of her provincial husband, learns to see his virtues; at the end they share the simple meal of the title. Her niece rebels against an arranged marriage; because of her rebellion, she meets a young friend of the husband's with whom we see a romance starting.

Apparently the postwar reworking of the story injured it. The wife's conversion is mechanical. The niece's meeting with the young man is too neat, too certain to turn out well. Still the film is Ozu. His gentle firmness holds the pictures and the rhythms exactly; and his belief in what he is doing, which is what lifts *Tokyo Story* to a pinnacle, almost raises *Green Tea* to wholeness.

Two special points of interest. Ozu uses his famous *tatami* shot—at floor-mat level—even in scenes with chairs and bar stools. He insists on the Japanese view amidst Western decor. And there is a happy surprise in a pinball arcade. The husband and the young man are playing the machines; one machine jams, and they pound it. The owner sticks his head over a partition to tell them to cut it out, and discovers that the husband is his old army sergeant. *We* discover that the owner is Chishu Ryu, the superb actor who played the old father in *Tokyo Story* in the following year, here unshaven, dark-haired, and tough. It's like seeing Max von Sydow pop up in minor roles in Bergman films. Ryu appeared in all but two of Ozu's 54 films.

If you could somehow weave a new leading actress into the master print of *The Getaway*, you would have a first-class crime thriller. All it needs is not to have Ali McGraw. Well, that's not quite all, still it would be so great an improvement that the other faults would fade. The two leading characters are a bank robber and his wife—who are *not* characters, just stock figures. Steve McQueen, who was so good and complete in *Junior Bonner*, has no "internalizing" to do here. He is simply a commanding pro. McGraw is his wife. We never know who they are or why, but McQueen is enough of a star to silence our questions. McGraw is a zero, so she makes us question her all the time.

Outside of that (immense) flaw, the picture is smashing. Sam Peckinpah directed, damn him. He is quite clearly a madman with, among other gifts, an extraordinary talent for murder, so powerful that he makes us enjoy blood. "Down, Peckinpah!" cries civilization. "Oh, yeah?" grins Sam, knowing the truth about us. Part of that truth is that if you have enough ability and enough conviction, you can make almost anything work in art.

This is his first film, since *The Wild Bunch*, about a man who kills as part of his profession, so it is his best since then. *The Ballad of Cable Hogue* was all wrong for him, from the title on. *Straw Dogs* was about an intellectual who is forced to prove manhood physically; the moralizing took the (cold) heart out of Peckinpah's amorality. *Junior Bonner* was about an aging rodeo rider: the "age" element of *The Wild Bunch* without killing. Now Peckinpah is back where he belongs—with killers whose only ethics is expediency.

At the opening McQueen has been in a Texas penitentiary for four years; we see him denied parole. He then asks his wife to visit a crooked big shot (who is on the parole board) and say that he's up for sale. She sees the man and gets her husband released; together with two others, the pair then rob a bank for the big man. (Also McQueen later learns that McGraw has slept with the man to help convince him.)

It begins to seem like one more Perfect Crime film. But the job goes wrong, for various reasons, and the pair find themselves on the lam, hunted not only by the police but by one of their gang and by the pals of the big shot. People get killed, dropping like leaves in a storm. Peckinpah insures that image with his familiar slow-motion for most of the deaths. The script is by Walter

(continued on page 41)

Films Worth Seeing

The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie. Buñuel, apparently getting younger, mocks the fantasies of the stuffily corrupt with pitiless wit.

The Emigrants. Liv Ullmann. Max von Sydow. If that's not enough, some truth about 19th-century Sweden that drove people to the US.

Jeremiah Johnson. Robert Redford as a trapper in the Rockies 130 years ago, in a picture of exceptional authenticity.

Pete 'n' Tillie. Laugh-and-cry entertainment, three-quarters good. Walter Matthau and Carol Burnett as mature newlyweds.

The Ruling Class. A generally fascinating mess about a religious nut who inherits an earldom. Peter O'Toole fine, as are most of the others.

The Sorrow and the Pity. German-occupied France and France today, interwoven in a sterling four-and-a-half-hour documentary.

Traffic. Jacques Tati's latest comedy is his best: a balletic spoof about auto madness. Actually more to be looked at than laughed at.

SK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sedulus on TV

Two for the Price of One

I found myself a few nights ago at Washington's Folger Shakespeare Library for a preview of CBS's three-hour Shakespeare special, Joseph Papp's *Much Ado About Nothing* (which appeared for real over CBS in prime time for three hours on February 2). There were murky moments in the first two acts when the pairings of the lovers lost me and a great many mere Shakespearean words didn't enter my inner ear—but in general it *was* understandable.

Papp is one of the great anybody-can-appreciate-it practitioners, but ironically his practice shows he doesn't believe anybody *can* appreciate it. He acknowledges a wide cultural gap between Shakespeare and us by making great stage efforts to bridge it. Furthermore his method of bridging seems to me the least promising. He wants to be faithful to the original, and at the same time hep, that is, accommodating to the demands of a modern and not-up-to-the-original audience; hence, rather than revising the original he puts a second play on top of it. In the present TV production, which I am told is a very straight transmutation to film of the stage version now playing in New York, Papp provides setting and clothing out of the Gay '90s—this being a temporal removal the audience *has* been educated up to—and imports music and conventions from early film melodrama; but he leaves Shakespeare's script intact, so that the villain doesn't say "curses," but what Shakespearean villains say. The result is two plays, with the Shakespearean play rendered hysterical by its competitor.

Shakespeare's medium was words. Here the words compete with bright busy images and a sophisticated musical score. The Shakespeare part of the play would have been more "visible," I submit, on radio. Only when the screen medium achieves a rare quiet moment do the words manage to dominate the pictures. Such domination occurred chiefly in Act III, the play's high moment, when Benedick soliloquizes comically in a canoe, and listens in on comments about himself and Beatrice. Here the words matter; they are audible and well paced, and are effectively reinforced but not supplanted by the clever canoe business. More typical, however, is the handling of Dogberry, Shakespeare's malaprop constable, where the words are so slurred that the word-play is rarely evident, being replaced by vaudevillean pushing and shoving.

The hysteria I refer to comes from having both the plays—or perhaps I should say both the media—going at full speed at once. Instead of a light comedy and the appropriate emotional levels for light comedy, we are treated to a big, loud, indiscriminate bundle of farce, tragedy, melodrama and fairy tale. The play on top of the Shakespeare play creates the indiscriminateness; it is a play of effects rather than unities; it moves from scene to scene doing what seems best to give horsepower to each, rather than trying to enforce the singular old conventional verbal-comic mode.

There is not only the hysteria of too much and too often, but also the final fatigue of too long. Two plays on top of each other don't take quite twice as long as one, but the abundance of stage business must add at least half to three-quarters of an hour to a straight reading of the play. And the play is damnably long anyway for a modern audience. Richard Jencks, vice president of CBS, introducing it at the Folger to a small audience of congressmen, journalists and media people, said he hoped 20 million would be watching it on February 2nd, or more than had watched *Much Ado* in all the years since its first staging. I wondered, after sitting through five acts handsomely visible on the Folger's good big screen, how many of the 20 million would hang in there in their living rooms, in front of a 12-incher, for three hours.

This is CBS's big season for specials, and it is with the specials that, as I see it, the industry will find its way. The specials can be at once experimental and saleable, being one-shot affairs that the curious will turn on for at least a piece of. To experiment with how long an audience not watching the Miami Dolphins will sit there for *Much Ado* is a worthy and daring venture, though it fails.

Ah Shakespeare if thou wert living at this hour, wouldst thou not like a one-hour slot? And wouldst thou not like to *merge* those two plays, to meet the new demands of the medium and the Kulch? I think so. I think we could makest thou into a good media man after just one sitting at the Folger.

The Family Romance

The Anxiety of Influence

by Harold Bloom

(Oxford University Press; $5.95)

Somebody should start a magazine called *The Adversary Relationship*. The press has an adversary relationship to government, the child has an adversary relationship to parent, the student has an adversary relationship to teacher—and, above all, the individual has an adversary relationship to the multitudinous collectivizings around him. Now Professor Harold Bloom of Yale has tried to demonstrate, in what should be one of the most discussed books of literary criticism in some time, that poetry for the last 300 years is nothing more than a working out of adversary relationships between poets.

Bloom gives us Milton's Satan as the model adversary, and Milton's God as the ancestor poet against whom Satan—as an "ephebe" poet—must struggle. (Yes, the reader must accustom himself to words like "ephebe" if he reads Bloom.) The ephebe is a poet who is just growing into his adversary role. He is an angel of God, which means that he is under the poetic influence of God—Wordsworth the ephebe of Milton, Roethke the ephebe of Yeats, and so on—and can never wholly escape his servitude; yet he is also a fallen angel,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one who has "swerved"—to use another term from Bloom's glossary—from the God path, and is therefore in a position where he can (sometimes) imagine himself as liberated. The swerve is the sign and evidence of his adversariness, and though it may manifest itself in six different ways (let me merely list the "six revisionary ratios" and be then forever silent on the subject; they are Clinamen, Tessera, Kenosis, Daemonization, Askesis and Apophrades!), it remains only a swerve, or deviation, or revision rather than a new venture; hell remains a suburb of heaven.

What this Satan-poet wants is the freedom from heaven he cannot have. He would be a solitary genius without precedents and borrowings; he would be new under the sun, nonrepetitive; but his fate is to be instead, like Satan, merely fallen, and obliged to accept that condition and "explore the limits of the possible within it." His struggles to break loose are what produce the anxiety of Bloom's title, and this anxiety is best understood not in the terms of Milton's theology but in the terms of Freud's analysis of the psyche, Freud who is Bloom's guide and god—and no adversary either. Anxiety as characterized by Freud begins, Bloom tells us, in the child upon its separation from the mother, and is "analogous to later castration anxiety"; it then emerges in a literary way in the poet (this is Bloom's addition to Freud) as a fear of "any danger that might *end him* as a poet."

One could quote from Book II of *Paradise Lost* at this point, and discuss whether it is or is not possible for God to end devils' careers, but we are better off with Freud's own created epic, what he calls the "family romance," an archetypal drama in which the child's "feelings of tenderness [for the parents] mingle with the longing to be big and independent himself." The resultant complications produce, by Freudian logic, a wish on the part of the child to replace the father, to give the mother a child and thus "to be *the father of himself*" [Freud's italics]. To be this father in poetic terms, adds Bloom, means "to become one's own Great Original."

Are any readers still with me? If so, I ask them to note that Bloom does not here imagine himself to be describing merely a particular kind of poet—the dark melancholic kind to be found sulking in school corridors because the world harkens not to his genius—but describing the one and only characteristic poet of the modern (last 300 years) age. And note also that Bloom does not imagine his book to be simply an exploration of poetic motivation. No, he would have it that he is dealing with the essential meaning and substance of poetry too; he tells us that a study of, say, Wordsworth's swervings from Milton is or should be the whole shebang of lit crit.

"Let us," he asserts, with a mixture of nihilistic grandeur and simple English-teacher weariness, "give up the failed enterprise of seeking to 'understand' any single poem as an entity in itself" (here throwing away, among others, his Yale colleagues Brooks and Warren). "Let us pursue instead the quest of learning to read any poem as its poet's deliberate misinterpretation . . . of a precursor poem or of poetry in general." This pursuit of an ephebe's poetic origins Bloom regards as the main job of "practical criticism," and his particular contribution to it.

Remember I. A. Richards' book, *Practical Criticism*? It appeared in 1929. In effect Bloom is telling us that literary criticism has since then found for itself

Is there room in a democracy for a secret police?

No public body ever dared investigate the FBI — not even Congress — until this book. J. Edgar Hoover expected it to be a smear. It might have surprised him. You may be surprised too.

"The most important and definitive study on the FBI. Essential reading for those who care about safety and freedom."—*Ramsey Clark*


Investigating The
FBI
A Tough, Fair Look At The Powerful BUREAU Its Present And Its Future
BY
Robert Sherrill, Burke Marshall, Victor Navasky, Thomas I. Emerson, Fred J. Cook, I. F. Stone, ex-FBI agents, and others.
EDITED BY PAT WATTERS AND STEPHEN GILLERS
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
TOM WICKER
DOUBLEDAY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Proposed New Issue

PARTNERS IN HOUSING
Limited Partnership Interests

Price $1,500 each, payable over 8 months.

A tax-sheltered real estate investment partnership providing good multiracial housing for low and moderate income families. Federal tax laws allow investors in housing significant tax incentives.

Neither the Attorney General of the State of New York nor the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey nor the Bureau of Securities of the State of New Jersey has passed on or endorsed the merits of this offering. Any representation to the contrary is unlawful.

▶ Help end the injustice of closed housing. Mail coupon for preliminary prospectus.

James Farmer & Morris Milgram
Partners in Housing, Dept. 11 B
8702 Crispin, Phila., Pa. 19136

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

A registration statement relating to these securities has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission but has not yet become effective. These securities may not be sold nor may offers to buy be accepted prior to the time the registration statement becomes effective. This advertisement shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy nor shall there be any sale of these securities in any state in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under securities laws of such states.

NOW YOU CAN OWN PURE

SILVER



UNIVERSAROS and BARS

Silver is security! You can buy 999 fine (99.9% pure) silver in small or large ingots, Universaro's or art objects. Think of your family and your business now.

GET THE FACTS TODAY! Send for FREE BROCHURE. ORDER DIRECT FROM THE FACTORY AND SAVE

INTERNATIONAL MINT CORPORATION 315 East 2nd South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CALL TOLL FREE (800) 453-5320

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____

Zip _____ Phone _____

No obligation, naturally! R1

a practical function the reverse of that announced by Richards. Richards was a psychologically oriented critic too, and in *his* version of the practical, he was, in his primitive but sensible amateur psychologist way, most interested in analyzing reader responses to poems. But his reader-interest led him in the opposite direction from Bloom with regard to the poems themselves. For him the poems were in effect the rock from which one might detect reader swervings. Now has come the time to remove the rock, the "entity in itself."

To catch the full significance of the Bloom proposal I think it may be useful to focus on its psychic rather than its literary orientation. After all, the issues of literary indebtedness have been with us through the ages, but what Bloom is adding to the familiar academic drudgery of tracing literary sources is a 20th-century version of the 19th-century preoccupation with poets' lives, against which Richards and the later New Critics rebelled. In doing so he is much in the psychic swim. Theodore Roszak wrestled with the ideologies of the '60s in his recent book, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, and having duly balanced "social reality" against "psychic reality" came to the tormented conclusion that both were real but "psychic reality" was *realer*—which is what Bloom now also, in his own league, comes up with. The result in both cases—that is, in Roszak in his dealings with the sociological swerve that created the counterculture, and in Bloom in his dealings with poetic swerve—is that an individual's private sensibility, rather than his culture or his poem, becomes the primary subject. Roszak searches for ways of keeping or restoring the health of the private sensibility in a technological society. Bloom searches for the causes of the sensibility's poetic responses in a sort of social-cultural vacuum. In both cases it is the private sensibility that is attended to, not the "other" it lives with or serves.

The private sensibility has become our obsessive concern, in art as well as life. Bloom's preoccupations are not his alone, and it could be said that in one sense he has merely codified, for poetry, in his eccentric way, what almost any editor or teacher of creative writing knows about the undistinguished manuscripts that pass before him, that they are the products of troubled selves asserting their selfdoms. The selves may not be big enough to be Satanic; but whether strong or weak they are private and inward, and each of them is busy, as Freud would have him, at being "the father of himself." But in another sense—and here is where this reader runs into trouble with Bloom—Bloom seems to be describing not the common condition at all, but the ideal of poetry, that is, what Bloom thinks the art is, at its best, about. There are many minor annoyances to be confronted in his book—it is pretentiously esoteric, and not at all "practical" as alleged—but the chief annoyance, at least for me, is Bloom's own yen for the Satanism he has "discovered."

Not that I wish to deny him his general adversary vision of what poetry has come to be. I think there is much to be said for it, both as a vision of the way poetry comes into being, and as a suggestive approach to some of the problems of teaching poetry. But there are many possible adversary visions, in and out of poetry—Marxist visions, Jungian visions, nonindividualist visions. One doesn't *have* to choose the Satanic individualist vision as the one and only; indeed to do so seems to me perverse and Satanic.

Bloom so chooses and in choosing he in effect insists that we should now finally forget about poetry and concentrate on poets. His theories need, for their sustenance, only phantom poems, poems that neither mean *nor* be, but only point to the beings behind them.

Bloom is like the linguists who have given up on meaning and are content to study verbal stances and how they arise. His position is thus a denial of any lingering hope for the classical vision of poetry—which, to be terminal here I shall merely characterize, in Irving Babbitt's much elaborated-upon term, as originating in *le sens commun*, as opposed to *le sens propre*. Furthermore, having issued his denial he then proceeds as if his denial were a godly edict that has already taken irreversible effect upon the whole of poetry. Who among contemporary poets does he acknowledge the existence of?—only A. R. Ammons and John Ashbery. One need not question either their merits or their influence to be disturbed by Bloom's neglect of *other* poetic presences and possibilities, a neglect that seems

Coming

Abe Ribicoff reviews
The Politics of a Guaranteed Income

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an extraordinary piece of intellectual insularity.

Our excesses of individualism are not producing a glorious adversary poetry of Satanic stature, but a poetry unread and unreadable that may properly be regarded as not art but therapy. That way does Bloom further lead us—and the only sensible next swerve away from his excesses may be poetic silence. I mean that a poet feeling a Bloom poem coming on may profitably go to a shrink instead, and get his adversary relationship fixed up without burdening a publisher. If the poems are of no consequence, why bother with them?

Reed Whittemore

Corporations, Colonies and Electric Toothbrushes

The Last Play

by James Ridgeway

(Dutton; $10)

This book might be subtitled, *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Energy Industry, But Were Afraid to Ask*. Unlike the equivalent tome on sex, it does not make for lively reading. Over half the book is a compendium of facts and figures about the energy resources of every major country and corporation. The remaining chapters describe in somewhat fragmented fashion a number of important trends: the takeover by oil companies of competing fuel sources; the shift from deep mining to strip mining of coal; the new rush for coal lands in the American West; the emerging "energy crisis" that the energy companies say can be cured by boosting their profits; the recent "plays" for oil and gas in the Arctic and East Asia; Japan's relentless drive for fuel resources, including our own. Some of these matters were discussed in Ridgeway's previous book, *The Politics of Ecology*, though not nearly in such detail. The chief purpose of his expanded treatment here is "to provide citizens' groups information which could be used in challenging corporations in rate cases, on electric utility franchise extensions, environmental and safety matters, and in general on corporate maneuvers in the energy industry."

If you're not a member of a corporate-challenging citizens' group, *The Last Play* can still provide grist for thought, but for digestion's sake I'd suggest you concentrate on the opening chapter and the chapter called "Conclusion." From these it is possible to extract Ridgeway's basic theme. The world is divided into two types of energy areas: colonies and consuming centers. The colonies are such places as Appalachia, Venezuela, the Middle East and the Pacific rim of Asia. The consuming centers include the big American cities, Western Europe and Japan. The giant energy corporations tie consumers and colonies together with wells, mines, pipelines, tankers, gas stations and electric wires. All the world's a hunting ground for these corporations, and their financial rewards for brokering the planet's energy resources are stupendous. They enrich themselves first by bleeding the colonies, and then by overcharging the consuming centers. Along the way they contribute mightily to the earth's environmental problems.

Is there a better way to produce and distribute energy? There certainly ought to be, and buried amidst Ridgeway's gobs of data is a sketch of what a better system might look like. Though ultimately disappointing, it's the most interesting part of the book. The privately owned but government-subsidized energy institutions, he argues, should be replaced by "public institutions." A federal energy board should supervise overall energy policy and negotiate for fuels in world markets. Several energy

How Can Vietnam Stand It?

Nearly 15 million dead, wounded and refugees. Three times as many tons of bombs as in World War II. How can they stand it, and fight back?

Helen Lamb's answer begins with the earliest history of Vietnam and chronicles the extraordinary heroism of the Vietnamese in their many struggles for independence. $10.

Vietnam's Will to Live

Resistance to Foreign Aggression From Early Times Through the Nineteenth Century

by Helen B. Lamb

At your bookstore or order directly from

Monthly Review Press
116 West 14th Street
New York, N.Y. 10011

Add sales tax where applicable and 20¢ for postage and handling.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

#1
BEST SELLER!
170,000 copies in print.
$10, now at your bookstore.
RANDOM HOUSE


regions should also be created. Each would have a publicly elected agency to plan energy policy and purchase or sell the region's energy resources, depending on whether the region was a net exporter or importer of energy. The energy resources themselves would be broken up into tracts, with every other tract reserved for development by the regional agency or nonprofit organizations. Federal loans would be available to help nonprofit groups enter the energy business. Long-distance interchanges of energy would be fed through existing private facilities (pipelines, refineries, gas stations, etc.), but these facilities would be treated as common carriers and required to operate at a fixed low rate of return. Environmental factors would be given due consideration by the regional and federal energy agencies. The Northeast agency, for example, might weigh the development of offshore oil in terms of the fuel's ultimate use. "If the petroleum were to be used principally in the manufacture of electricity and the electricity would go to a large new office complex in downtown New York, the regional agency would determine whether that building complex was necessary."



"Mandatory reading for every citizen."
—STUDS TERKEL

"Immensely interesting, lucidly written and filled with more insights and information about the so-called energy crisis than any other book I've come across.... a model of muckraking journalism-scholarship in the public interest."
—DANIEL S. GREENBERG
Saturday Review of Science

"A book to use as well as a book to read."
—RALPH NADER

THE LAST PLAY:
The Struggle to Monopolize the World's Energy Resources
by JAMES RIDGEWAY

dutton

$10.00 at booksellers

Other alternate approaches to energy have, of course, been floating around. Among the overseas energy colonies, five Persian Gulf countries recently negotiated an agreement with the major oil companies giving their governments an initial 25 percent equity in petroleum concessions, rising to 51 percent in 10 years. Libya has demanded 50 percent ownership of its oil concessions, and Venezuela will take over all foreign oil operations when their leases expire in 1984. Nationalism is of course a key factor in these countries' drives for resource ownership, and the lack of an obvious foreign target has hampered the drive for public ownership in the United States. But even in America, TVA and the rural electric co-ops have been around since the 1930s, and many municipally owned electric companies for longer than that. Lately some American voices—not mentioned by Ridgeway—have been saying that what's good for Persian sheiks ought to be good for places like Appalachia. Harry Caudill, the Kentucky lawyer and author, has urged the creation of local public development districts throughout Appalachia which would acquire, by condemnation if necessary, coal resources currently owned by absentee corporations. A similar recommendation was made last month by Gibbs Kinderman of the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund. Kinderman led a task force that researched the ways in which absentee-owned energy companies suck wealth out of Appalachia and thoroughly dominate its politics. "The possibility of adequate taxation of coal under the present setup is as remote as the possibility of adequate regulation," he concluded. The sensible alternative is "for the state to take the coal through its powers of eminent domain," paying the corporations with long-term state bonds at prices determined from current property tax valuations, and financing the bonds out of future coal earnings.

Compared to the measures adopted by foreign energy colonies and advocated by Appalachian reformers, Ridgeway's proposed energy system is full of enigmas. Private corporations would continue to own alternate tracts of coal and oil, for reasons that are not altogether clear. Energy development by locally owned enterprises would be limited to nonprofit groups; why not retain profitability, but channel profits to workers, schools and reduction of regressive local taxes? Except for a passing reference to federal loans, Ridgeway fails to explain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how his proposals would be financed. His notion that regional agencies would trace the ultimate use of energy down to specific office complexes seems far fetched, given the long lead times and enormous kilowattages involved in energy planning. It's not clear, in any case, whether regional agencies would be empowered to refuse delivery of energy to users deemed unecological, or whether the agencies would simply not expand their energy supplies, thereby possibly dejuicing some legitimate consumers of power.

Moreover, despite the fact that *The Last Play* is aimed at activists, there's a notable dearth of suggestions as to short-range goals that citizens can pursue. There are no tips on how urban-based groups might try to municipalize the retail end of the electric industry, no practical schemes for the takeover of energy resources in colonial areas, no list of clear-cut objectives (*e.g.*, a federal corporation to develop energy resources on public lands) that sympathetic congressmen might push for. The one concrete suggestion to citizens' groups is that they act "through the courts to block further sale or lease of energy resources in the federal or state domains unless and until government . . . conducts independent surveys of energy resources on which some sort of rational energy policy can be based." That's hardly worth getting out of bed for, since a "rational" energy policy is exactly what the giant energy corporations are plugging for.

The murkiness of Ridgeway's proposals is disappointing, particularly in view of the herculean research effort that he, and others he acknowledges, undertook. Nevertheless, *The Last Play* provides a good starting point for the kind of discussion that corporate critics and environmentalists ought to engage in more frequently. It is no longer enough, as has lately been fashionable, to inveigh against corporate power and disregard for the ecosystem. Nor is it sufficient, when discussing remedies, to place one's faith in the antitrust laws or other forms of government regulation. These have been on the books for half a century, haven't worked, and don't seem likely to. Some new economic institutions, involving public and community ownership, need to be developed. Ridgeway recognizes this, tries to deal with some implications, and others should too.

Peter Barnes

Kauffmann, *from page 35*

Hill, from a Jim Thompson novel, but it has a Peckinpah ring, including a salting of the salacious and a good deal of irony. The former is mostly supplied by the avenging robber (grotesquely well played by Al Lettieri) and the wife of a married couple whom he picks up as hostages. The irony runs all through.

For instance, in between the killings and escapades, McQueen and McGraw converse like just plain married folks, who might be having a spot of trouble and might stop in at a marriage counselor on their way to the Mexican border. At the end they are driven across that border by an old junk dealer, Slim Pickens, whose principal concern is whether they are legally married and who befriends them knowing they are wanted by cops. He accepts a fat payoff, choking back a tear of love for these sweet kids (who have both killed people in pretty good quantity), and leaves, after saying *"Vaya con Dios"* to them as if they were Van Johnson and June Allyson en route to sachet-scented procreation. It's insane. And it's funny, because Peckinpah has forced us to enjoy the killings.

When he is right, as he is here most of the time, he is overwhelming. Take the very first sequence under the titles: McQueen goes for his parole hearing, is turned down, and goes back to his cell and his prison work, tight with frustration—a gem of a sequence, cut with subliminal memories of his wife. Lucien Ballard's photography is steely blue and soft, as needed, but it is Peckinpah's eye that pierces to the nerve of every shot, that edits it all together with crackling electric force. There's no sense in a lesser word: when he's in his element, Peckinpah is masterly. This includes a sequence on a crowded train where McQueen chases a petty thief who has stolen his valise with half a million dollars in it, without knowing what's in the bag, and the final shoot-out in a dingy hotel.

Another touch. My favorite moment in *Straw Dogs* was just after Dustin Hoffman discovered the hanged cat in his bedroom closet; immediately there was a jump cut to a long shot of the lonely house with only the bedroom window lighted, then a cut back to the room. In *The Getaway* McQueen and McGraw are quarreling by their parked car when we suddenly cut to a long shot of them, then suddenly back again. The effect in both cases is to *hit* the scene, to keep it moving, like a boy hitting a hoop.

Of course all the realistic apparatus is basically in aid of romance. When the pair tumble out of a garbage truck in which they've let themselves be packed so they could escape police, they look as if they had just been slightly wind-tossed. When their fleeing car rams several other cars, then skids up and shears the front railings off a porch, all they feel is exasperation. This is, literally and figuratively, an escape picture: escape into pure violence, which, like most qualities, rarely exists in pure form.

There have been comparisons with *Bonnie and Clyde*. Disregard. This pair have no mission or "meaning." As in all romances, *The Getaway* simply extracts one element of reality and dwells in it. Nor is the violence "American." Pictures like this don't fail overseas.

A note from a Pennsylvania reader: "For God's sake, warn your readers about *Up the Sandbox* before it's too late." He's right; and I hope I'm not too late. Barbra Streisand's new picture—about a daydreaming New York wife—is more glittery trash, like *The Heartbreak Kid:* a lot of mod surface verisimilitude covering fakeries, thematic cop-outs, and dullness.

The suggestion in the title is off target.

AUTHORS WANTED BY NEW YORK PUBLISHER

leading book publisher seeks manuscripts of all types: fiction, non-fiction, poetry, scholarly and juvenile works, etc. New authors welcomed. For complete information, send for booklet NR-1. It's free. Vantage Press, 516 West 34 St., New York, N.Y. 10001.

Personals

HAND-HEWN OAK BEAM, 19" x 19" x 65'. 1945 Gildersleeve, Bronx, New York 10473.

INSPIRATION—"YOUTH IS NOT A TIME OF LIFE." Ideal for framing. One dollar. Garry, 406 W. 34 St., Kansas City, Missouri 64111.

SAN FRANCISCO journalist, 40s, author, teacher, varied interests, wants to meet lovely woman 25 to 40. New Republic Box 6435.

KENNEDY FOR PRESIDENT IN '76. Extra large picture-button. Send $1.00 to: Camelot, 16436 Norell Avenue, Marine, Minnesota 55047.

"CRIME WOULDN'T PAY IF THE GOVERNMENT RAN IT"—8 x 10 plaque, $3.50 ppd, 4/$12.50. Wry Idea Co., Rye, New York 10580.

CONDITIONING, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, BRAINWASHING! Help expose worrisome developments in these fields. Contributions appreciated. Dr. William A. Pierce (Ph.D. Harvard University) P.O. Box 244, Lyndonville, Vermont 05851.

FEEL GREAT. Every Day. Not Exercises. Absolutely Guaranteed. $5.00. Dr. Marcus, Box 12425, Philadelphia, Pa. 19151.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Personals

ALPHAPHONE® headset—brainwave trainer. Free literature. Aquarius Electronics, Box 627-Q, Mendocino, California 95460.

MEDITATION? Practice invokes knowledge, evokes insight. First year bimonthly training course free. Write MEDITATIONS, P.O. Box 566 N, Ojai, California 93023.

PENFRIENDS. For free information write: Papyrus, Box 458NE, Winston-Salem, N.C. 27102.

SLEEP-LEARNING: HYPNOTISM! Strange catalogue free. Autosuggestion, Box 24—NR, Olympia, Washington.

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS IN DEPTH, $10.00 and sample to Elisabeth King, 41 E. 29th Street, New York 10016.

HELP AN UNDERPRIVILEGED AMERICAN INDIAN CHILD to remain in school, and have a new friend who needs you. $15 monthly. Futures for Children, 5612 Parkston Road, Washington, D. C. 20016, (301) 320-3536.

MAKE YOUR WILL. Receive 4 Will Forms and attorney's 64-page booklet, only $1.50. ("Personal Assets Record" and "Executor's Duties"—FREE.) Legal Forms, Dept. 25, 1830 Guardian Building, Detroit, Michigan 48226.

A SEVERELY UNDERPRIVILEGED SPANISH-AMERICAN child in New Mexico needs you to sponsor him. Correspondence, visitation, $180. per year. Futures for Children, 5612 Parkston Road, Washington, D. C. 20016.

OUTSTANDING imprinted personal stationery. Social-professional. Idea-Packed sampler-catalog—25¢. Jacques Stationery, Box 395-N, Wallingford, Vermont 05773.

FIGHT THE ANNUAL BUTCHERY! Handsome fluorescent bumper/window strip urges: "Be a *Real* Sport—Hunt with a Camera." 50¢, 3/$1.00. Denny Larke, Box 339-R, Roseville, Michigan 48066.

ABOLISH ALL ABORTION LAWS without exception. The right of each adult human to own his or her own body is the paramount moral law, without exception. AAAL, P.O. Box 36122, Los Angeles, California 90036.

BLOW YOURSELF UP! 1½' x 2' poster of anyone. Send returned snapshot $3.00. Pierpoint Products, Box 678, Inglewood, California 90307.

CIGARS—MISS YOUR HAVANA CIGARS? New Havana Seed tobacco lets you enjoy the old Havana flavor. Free brochure—write AFCO CIGARS, P.O. Box 5111, Tampa, Florida 33605.

Peace Personals

"POVERTY, DISEASE: ENEMY ENOUGH FOR ALL OF US," "Let's SHOOT BASKETS Instead" bumperstickers, 2/$1, 5/$2, Box 95-R, Cambridge, NY 12816.

BUMPERSTICKERS, DECALS, BUTTONS, Low-cost, custom made advertising for your Business, Special Event, Organization or Political Campaign. Buy direct from manufacturer and SAVE! Please state intended use for appropriate samples. Write for FREE Brochure, Price List and Samples. REFLECTIVE ADVERTISING, INC., Dept. NR, 8551 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63114. Phone (314) 423-5495.

Literature

READ THE GUARDIAN—independent radical newsweekly for news and analysis of movements for national liberation, struggles in the black community, working class organizing and women's liberation from a Marxist perspective. Special 10-week trial subscription: $1.00. Guardian, Dept. D, 32 West 22nd St., New York, N.Y. 10010. (Full year, $10.00; student $5.00.)

RIVER CITY REVIEW, an entertaining and enlightening monthly tabloid of music, astrology, poetry, short stories, feature articles, theater (drama and movies), and commentary. For the inquiring and daring mind. Subscribe today. Must be 17 or over. ONE YEAR FOR ONLY $3.00! RIVER CITY REVIEW, P.O. BOX 3423, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103.

BEST BOOKFINDERS IN NEW YORK: ORSAY BOOKS, 86-32 Eliot Ave., Rego Park, New York 11347.

FREE BOOK, Prophet Elijah Coming Before Christ. Megiddo Mission, Dept. 72, 481 Thurston Road, Rochester, New York 14619.

OPEN TO CONTROVERSY? There are two sides to every question. Send for free booklet, "The Cigarette Controversy," Dept. TNR, The Tobacco Institute, 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20006.

Literary Services

RESEARCH AIDS
Social issues. This publication is for the person who is researching or writing an article or speech. Includes an extensive annotated bibliography. Covers the following subjects: Women's Liberation, Abortion, Legalization of Drugs, Black Power Today. Send check or money order for $4.95 to: Research Reports Publications, Suite #5, 6400 Georgia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20012. Local representatives wanted.

WRITERS—"UNSALABLE" MANUSCRIPT? Try AUTHOR AID ASSOCIATES, 340 East 52nd Street, New York City 10022.

LIBRARY INFORMATION. Research by professional librarians. All fields. Box 8202, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15217.

PUBLISH YOUR OWN BOOK. We print few as 200 copies paperback, hard cover, pamphlets. Quality, economy, and cooperation. FREE Details. Graphic-copy, Box 285R, Floral Park, New York 11011.

Have Something to Sell?

Write your own classified for just $6.00

For only 60¢ per word your 10 word classified ad will reach more than 400,000 readers. There is no limit in length so be as prolific as your budget allows. Use the form below to send us your order.

Please run the enclosed advertisement _____ times in THE NEW REPUBLIC. Advance payment of $_____ is enclosed.

_____

_____

_____

(See rates next page)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Schools

UNIQUE COLLEGE-STYLE CURRICULUM allows high-school students to begin courses in January. Students concentrate on two or three courses per semester. Barlow is co-educational, grades 9 through 12. 550-acre campus offering college prep course, extraordinary arts and music activities, special on and off campus projects, work and camping programs. Informal atmosphere. Emphasis on the individual. Write: David Brownell, Barlow School, Amenia, N.Y. 12501. Or call 914-373-8111.

LEARN SPANISH IN MEXICO. If you really want to learn Spanish intensively and economically, start any Monday at CIDOC. For catalog on language school and de-schooled academy, write: CIDOC, APDO 479, Cuernavaca, Mexico.

Camps

THE PUTNEY WORK CAMP provides an experience that integrates work and recreation, arts and crafts, with current concerns. A vitalizing summer with well motivated contemporaries. Co-ed, 13-17. Apprenticeship program and off-campus study projects. The Putney School, Putney, Vt. 05346. (802) 387-4212.

CAMP BLUE HERON, Port Loring, Ontario. Our eleventh year providing informal and individualized programs of nature study, canoe tripping, and fun in the Ontario wilderness. Co-ed, ages 8-14, 30 campers each session; three-week sessions commencing June 24, July 15, August 5. Transportation provided to and from Buffalo or Toronto. Write 4200 Harris Hill Road, Williamsville, N.Y. 14221. Telephone (716) 633-6193 or (513) 275-6976

GREENFIELDS is an experimental, summer community for teenagers. Art workshops, daily excursions, communal living style, lots of joy. . . . RD 1, Box 424, W. Hurley, N.Y. 12491.

Foreign Studies

MEET RUSSIANS FACE-TO-FACE on 3-week non-political non-profit exchange visits to the USSR. Open to qualified Americans, all ages, occupations. Departures June through December. Write-Wire-Phone Citizen Exchange Corps, Dept. NR, 10 West 46th Street, New York, New York 10036 (212) 581-8113.

Employment Wanted

COUPLE, MIDDLE-AGED, LOOKING FOR CHANGE, would like to work either where there are people-needs or natural beauty, or both. Money unimportant, don't expect American living standard. Husband, now consulting electronic engineer, skilled in communications and many other electronic disciplines; wife, social worker, good at establishing rapport with people in need. New life need not be related to old careers. New Republic Box 6420.

SECOND YEAR LAW STUDENT, law review etc., from national law school seeks interesting summer employment. New Republic Box 6430.

Employment Wanted

CHALLENGING SUMMER sought by single, undergraduate, male, science major. Retail management experience. Two years radio broadcasting experience. Interested in people, politics, and science. Rich Flaskegaard, H3671 Helser, ISU, Ames, Iowa 50010

Employment Opportunities

LAWYERS/VISTA. Volunteer to assist low-income groups. Work in legal services programs, legal aid agencies. Urban & rural areas, Indian Reservations, Chicano communities, etc. Information: Bruce Mazzie, ACTION, OCP Box 172B, Washington, D. C. 20525.

ADMINISTRATOR: High level executive to assist in planning and management of international child-care organization, willing to relocate in overseas field office, administer child-care centers. ADFC-type work, school assistance, orphanages, and other child-care programs. Must be flexible, creative, detail oriented, able to work with national personnel overseas, negotiate with government officials. Bachelor's or Master's in Business Administration, MSW, or other child-oriented field. Demonstrated skills in management. Salary based on experience and training, usual fringes and increases. For information please write: Dr. Ed Janss, Christian Children's Fund, Inc., Third and Cary, Box 26511, Richmond, Virginia 23283.

EXCITING OVERSEAS JOBS. Directory $1.00. Research Associates, Box 889-N, Belmont, California 94002.

WORK IN DEVELOPING MEXICO. Rapid advancement, negligible taxes, inexpensive entertainment, pleasant living, peace. List of 200 United States, international, Mexican companies. Immigration procedure. $2.00. Informex, NR, Box 55361, Houston, Texas 77055.

Spare Time

HOW TO MAKE MONEY Writing Short Paragraphs! I tell you what to write, where and how to sell, and supply lists of editors buying from beginners. Small checks can add up to worthwhile extra income. Write to sell, right away. Send for free facts on my "Home Studies in Writing," Barrett, Dept. C-456-T, 6216 N. Clark, Chicago 60660.

STUFF ENVELOPES. Average $25.00 Hundred. Immediate earnings. Beginner's Kit, $1 (refundable). Lewcard, Box T392NR, Brea, Calif. 92621.

Property—Sale/Rent

GOVERNMENT LANDS . . . Low as $3.50 Acre! Vacationing, Homesteading, Investment! Exclusive "Government Land Buyer's Guide" . . . plus "Land Opportunity Review" listing lands available throughout U. S., send $1.00. Surplus Lands, Box 19107-SM, Washington, D. C. 20036

Vacations/Travel

VIEQUES ISLAND PUERTO RICO: Beautiful beaches, uncrowded. 20 minutes San Juan. Ocean-front efficiencies. $60.-$110. weekly. McNamara, Vieques, Puerto Rico 00765.

SAN FRANCISCO ON A BUDGET? Charming, centrally located. Hotel Beresford, 635 Sutter Street.

WORLDWIDE FREIGHTER GUIDE—$1.75. Rates, schedules, 700 passenger carrying freighters. TravLtips, 40-21 J Bell, Bayside, New York 11361.

Arts and Crafts

CRAFTS AT RIVERWAY. For summer space write Box 322, Kingston, Rhode Island 02881.

BOOKPLATES. Free catalog. Many beautiful designs. Address BOOKPLATES, Box 28F, Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387.

TIRED OF PLASTICS? Try Driftwood mobiles and kits. Free Catalog. Drift House, 4337G Cottage, Sacramento, California 95825.

Records/Tapes

FREE "REEL NEWS" Newsletter for open-reel (reel-to-reel) enthusiasts. Write: Barclay-Crocker, Room 333K, 11 Stone Street, N.Y.C. 10004.

Music

EASY TO PLAY AND MAKE. Quality instruments and kits: Dulcimers ($20 up), Psalteries, Banjos, Thumb Pianos; books, records, HERE, Inc., #N, 410 Cedar Ave., Minneapolis, Minnesota 55404.

BURTON HARPSICHORDS AND VIRGINALS—Professional instruments in kit form. Burton Jacks (Patented), $195-$650. Write Burton Harpsichords, 917 O Street, Box 80222NR, Lincoln, Nebraska 68501.

HARPSICHORDS, CLAVICHORDS by Sperrhake. Dependable, beautiful, moderately priced. Robert S. Taylor, 8710 Garfield Street, Bethesda, Maryland.

SASSMANN HARPSICHORDS. Kastenbau construction. Meticulous craftsmanship. Brochures. Gregoire. Harpsichord Distributors, Charlemont, Mass. 01339.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion) ..... 60¢
Per word 6 times in one contract year ..... 55¢
Per word 12 times in one contract year ..... 50¢
Per word 24 times in one contract year ..... 45¢
Per word 48 times in one contract year ..... 40¢

Payment in Advance of Insertion Required for Less Than 24 Insertions in One Year

24 & 48 Insertions Billed Monthly with One Month's Payment in Advance

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Great Art Treasures at SALE PRICES

PRINTED WITH A 18" x 24" IMAGE ON 20" x 26" GENUINE TEXTURED

Artist Canvas

REGULARLY TO $15. NOW ONLY

$4.95

At Lambert Studios the reproduction of an original work of art is a patient and laborious operation. It requires the skill and technical ability of man and machine to achieve perfect conformity. To insure that every subtle nuance of color appears exactly as in the original trial printings, subsequent corrections, and re-touching are necessary. The result is a reproduction in which the work of the artist, rather than being copied is recreated. Order directly from the first and largest publishers of canvas reproductions at sale prices with a money-back guarantee.



312.PICASSO.PETIT FLEURS Sale 4.95.Stretched 6.95

The Mounted Print only $6.95



766.MONET – Sailing Boat. Sale 4.95.Mounted $6.95

Lambert Studios utilizes the finest equipment available to expertly laminate our canvas prints to a sturdy backing board. This technique heightens the textural quality of the canvas art, and facilitates every type of framing. By using the convenient adhesive tabs included with each mounted print you can simply and smartly hang it on any wall without framing. As no nails are necessary, the wall surface is not damaged and you can change your art to suit your mood. It can be cleaned easily with a damp cloth and is in all ways durable. We will mount any of our canvas prints and ship them to you in a sturdy container. Complete for only $6.95.

261.PICASSO.DON QUIXOTE An inspiration in black on pure white.Reg.$7.Sale 4.95

271.VAN GOGH.STARRY NIGHT.In swirling blues and spirating yellows, browns,and greens.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95

212.VAN GOGH.SUN-FLOWERS. Autumn tones of yellow.Reg.$12. Sale 4.95

828.VAN GOGH:OLD SHOES Muted shades of brown,gold and black.Reg.$14.Sale 4.95


Yea though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death I shall fear no evil for I am the meanest Son of a Bitch in the valley!

441.Poster.New version of the 23rd psalm.Bright yellow & black.Reg.$10.Sale 4.95

247.PICASSO.BLUE NUDE Pastel shades of blue,green, soft beige.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

309.VAN GOGH:CAFE AT ARLES.Shades of gold,blue and black.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95

743.COWBOY.Lifelike flesh tones.Deep blues,tans,brown and black.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

831.HOKUSAI: GOD OF MIRTH.One of the 7 lucky gods:Hotei.In deep black & pale antique sepia.Reg.$16.Sale 4.95



837.KLEE:YOUNG TREE. Soft crimson on delicate,pale pink,white.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

722.ROUSSEAU.VIRGIN FOREST.In cool,deep jungle shades of green,tan, black,yellow & blue.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95



747.MONET.GIVERNY GARDENS.Shades of soft,pale blue, & yellow gold.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

265.MONET.RED POPPIES.In paste shades of green,cerrulean blue,orang white & pale yellow.Reg.$10.Sale 4.9



313.PICASSO.DANCE OF PEACE.Yellow,brown,green on pure white.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95

768.VAN GOGH.BOATS AT SAINT MARIE.Windswept sunlit shades of gold, blue,green and brown.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95

276.PICASSO.OLD QUITARIST.Shades of blue,greens and white.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95

204.MODIGLIANI.SKETCH IN RED.Radiant red,violet blue & pink.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

401.BOSCH.GARDEN OF EARTHLY DELIGHTS Shades of red,green,blue,yellow & tan.23"x35". Reg.$20.Sale 9.95. Also available stretched 12.95

791.VAN GOGH.CORNFIELD.Harvest yellows,golds,earthy browns,tans & summer blue & green.Reg.$15 Sale 4.95

783.VAN GOGH.AVENUE OF POPLARS.Important drawing in sepia tones.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

627.REMBRANDT:LION RESTING. Masterful brown & black brushstrokes on antique beige.Reg.$15. Sale 4.95



803.JOCK.Young,fresh and virile.In full springtime colors.Reg.$13.Sale 4.95

237.UNICORN IN CAPTIVITY.Tapestry of green,yellow,white.Reg.$9.Sale 4.95

819.BRADLEY.PETIT FILLE. In antique red,gold,flesh on deep black.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

286.VAN GOGH.STARLIGHT.Midnight shades of deep blue & soft blue,ebony black and pale yellow.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

252.PICASSO.THREE MUSICIANS.Brown,black,red,purple, white & tan.Reg.$12.Sale 4.95

445.MONET.WATER LILIES.Pale violet,deep green and yellow ochre hues of blue.Reg.$9.Sale 4.95

SPECIAL

227.KLEE.SINBAD THE SAILOR Fanciful reds,pinks,browns,blues and ebony black.Reg.$14.Sale 4.95

764.DA VINCI.WOMAN IN PROFILE.Subtle and mellow sepia tones.Reg.$10.Sale 4.95

761.MICHELANGELO.CREATION OF MAN.Color.Reg.$20. Sale 9.95.Stretched 12.95

820.PORTRAIT OF A MANDARIN.Full color.Reg.$20. Sale 9.95.Stretched 12.95.

826.ROUSSEAU:MONKE Jungle greens,orange,brow blue,black.Reg.$14.Sale 4.

266.REMBRANDT.GOLDE HELMET.Dark brown,black and gold.Reg.$15.Sale 4.95

769.RYER.LOVERS.Rich browns,flesh & golden yellows.Reg.$10.Sale 4.95

LAMBERT

PLEASE SEND ME THE FOLLOWING CANVAS PRINTS AT $4.95 EA. PLUS .85 POSTAGE AND HANDLING. LIST BY NUMBER

PLEASE SEND ME THE FOLLOWING STRETCHED CANVAS PRINTS AT $6.95 EA. PLUS $1.75 EA. POSTAGE AND HANDLING. LIST BY PRINT NUMBERS.

TOTAL ITEMS ____ TOTAL PRICE+ ____ TOTAL HANDLING ____ TOTAL +APPLICABLE SALES TAX ____

I ENCLOSE CASH-CHECK ____ MONEY ORDER
OR CHARGE MY (check one)
☐ Amer Exprs ☐ Bank Amer ☐ Mast Chrg bank name ____

SORRY NO C.O.D
MINIMUM MAIL ORDER $

Account # ____

Expiration Date ____ Signature ____

LAMBERT STUDIOS DEPT. ID9
910 N. LA CIENEGA BLVD., LOS ANGELES, CALIF. 9008

RITTER LIBRARY
BALDWIN-WALLACE
COLLEGE
FEB 6 19

Name ____
Address ____
City ____ State ____ Zip ____

WHOLESALE INQUIRIES INVITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED